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1 Introduction 
”Climate change is (…) a threat to peace and security. Changing patterns of 
rainfall, for example, can heighten competition for resources, setting in motion 
potentially destabilizing tensions and migrations, especially in fragile states or 
volatile regions”  - Kofi Annan  (UNEP 2006) 
  
These concerns have entered the political stage with full power over the past few 
years. In 2007, the UN Security Council held its first ever debate on climate change 
and its implications for security (Theisen et al. 2010), sending out strong signals 
regarding the ramifications climate change may have.  Some have even gone as far as 
to call climate change the mother of all security issues (Brown et al. 2007: 1141). This 
thesis offers an assessment of a narrower branch of this issue; how rainfall variability 
affects violent conflict.  
While no violent conflict can be attributed to one single cause alone, a growing 
number of scholars suggest environmental factors as having a significant causal role in 
conflicts around the world (Barnett and Adger 2007; Burke et al. 2009; Homer Dixon 
1999; Kahl 2006). Debates on how environmental degradation and resource scarcity 
can lead to conflict dates back about two centuries, to the writings of British political 
economist Thomas Malthus, but seem to increasingly have gained interest over the 
past few years.   
In recent years, the most popular new component to the environment – conflict debate 
seems to be that of climate change. Climate change is believed to be a result of human 
activities especially linked to industrialization and the burning of fossil fuels (Le Treut 
et al. 2007: 115), and it manifests itself through changes in precipitation, rising 
temperatures and the intensification of climatic natural hazards like for instance storms 
and flooding (Bernauer et al. 2010: 4). In the very core of several climate related 
hazards, lies water. Water is a vital resource; not only as a direct source of life, but it is 
also a necessary component in agriculture, that for many people in developing 
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countries is both a source of food and of income  (Theisen et al. 2010: 2). Changes in 
precipitation patterns may then cause enormous social disturbances in areas that are 
heavily dependent on vulnerable, rain fed agriculture. In addition, changes in rainfall 
are associated with extreme weather events such as storms, flooding and landslides. 
These pose additional challenges on human societies, especially on people living in 
areas that are particularly vulnerable to climate change due to for instance low levels 
of infrastructure and development. To conclude that climate change poses a severe 
challenge on human societies, however, is not to say that climate change increases 
conflict risk.  
In spite of the increased focus on the threat climate change may be to peace and 
stability – as materialized through for instance the awarding of the Nobel peace prize 
to the International Panel on Climate Change in 2007 – this link has yet to be fully 
supported by research.  There seems to be a divide between the qualitative and 
quantitative branches studying the climate change -  conflict nexus; qualitative 
researchers are in general more confident of the existence such a link than the scholars 
applying quantitative techniques. For although various empirical studies have found 
both full and partial support for such a connection (Hauge and Ellingsen 1998; Miguel 
et al. 2004; Burke et al. 2009), a majority of the studies have not (Theisen 2006; 
Keavane and Grey 2008; Bernauer et al. 2010; Buhaug 2010). Arguing that this 
inconsistency could be a result of how climatic indicators are measured, this thesis 
takes a closer look at this question.  
Rather than looking at climate change as a whole, the focus here is on rainfall 
variability. Rainfall patterns provide a good measure of climate change in being 
directly linked to the observed global warming, and by affecting human societies 
through extreme weather events,  and perhaps most importantly: through vital 
resources.   While many of the contributions in this literature have studied the link 
between rainfall and conflict, no conclusive evidence of such a relationship has been 
found. I argue that this lack of coherence in results may in part be caused by the 
independent variables used in some of these studies. It seems a popular approach to 
look at annual measurements of rain, and use the inter-annual changes as a 
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measurement of rainfall variability, measuring weather rainfall increases or decreases 
from year to year. Many such studies use as a point of departure that climate change is 
expected to create drier weather conditions, decreasing agricultural productivity, and 
that this again can lead to conflict under certain circumstances. However, it is not just 
the lack rain that affects resource availability, extreme rainfall too can have 
devastating impacts on agriculture (Theisen and Buhaug 2010). If one is to follow 
Malthusian logic and assume that a decline in resource availability may cause conflict, 
then rainfall variability should not be limited to lack of rain and drought. A lot of rain 
in a short period of time can be equally destructive for agriculture and other natural 
resources. It can pollute the drinking water,  and flood the land (Hendrix and Salehyan 
2010). Through rapid onset events like flooding and landslides, rainfall extremes can 
also take its toll on infrastructure leaving people in additional distress, thus backing 
arguments stressing how extreme weather events may increase conflict risk (see 
Brancati 2007). For this reason, I believe it is meaningful to capture all sides of rainfall 
when assessing the potential relationship between rainfall variability and conflict. It is 
not just the annual amount of precipitation that is important to asses, but rather the 
amount and the timing.  
The general research question motivating this thesis is:  
Do rainfall extremes affect violent conflict, and if so how? 
In answering this question, a first step is to identify what climate change is, and the 
possible causal connections between this and conflict.  Because of the aforementioned 
gap between the theoretical reasoning and the empirical evidence – both a theoretical 
and an empirical background for the hypothesised link will be provided. These lead to 
three specific hypotheses that will be empirically studied. Unlike previous studies, one 
of the underlying arguments here is that rainfall extremes, both negative and positive, 
can affect conflict risk. This provides a justification for this thesis in the broader 
debate. 
The geographical focus will be on Sub Saharan Africa, and in particular the eastern 
parts of the continent. Holding less historical responsibility for human induced climate 
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change than any other part of the world, it is a paradox that Africa is the first to be 
affected by the negative consequences of climate change (Boko et al. 2007). This is 
due to a combination of factors, including the relatively high dependence on 
agriculture, high environmental vulnerability, and low adaptive capacity (ibid; Theisen 
and Buhaug 2010). When it comes to rainfall patterns, the eastern parts of the 
continent seem to follow a different trend than the rest of Africa, experiencing more 
rain on average rather than less (Schreck and Semazzi 2004), and as a result this region 
will be of particular interest in this thesis – providing a good environment for studying 
the potential  effects of too much rain on conflict.  
Before going into detail about climate change and its consequences, I will narrow 
down the security concept, showing that it is meaningful to place this thesis as a small 
component in the broader climate change – security debate. Security as a concept, in 
its broader form, has grown to entail much more than being secure from war and 
violent conflict, yet war and violent conflict are still in the very core of security. 
1.1 Security 
As mentioned, this thesis places itself in a narrower branch of the general climate 
change – security debate. In the study of politics, international relations and peace and 
conflict, the word security has traditionally referred to national security. Securing state 
sovereignty has long been considered the main purpose of a state – defending its 
territory and keeping its citizens safe from external threats. As the world has gotten 
smaller, and liberal and humanitarian concerns have made their way all the way in to 
the realm of international politics, this has also changed how security is defined and 
how states consider it (Dokken 1997:69) . National security IS still very much a 
primary concern for the world’s states, yet how this is understood has perhaps 
changed. At the same time, wider definitions of security have begun to enter the 
political stage. Security no longer denotes state security alone, but also individual 
security. Furthermore, the idea of what it is we seek to stay secure form has also 
changed.  Not only external threats, but also internal ones are a concern to state 
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security. This way, civil wars are seen not only as a threat to individual security, but 
also potentially to state security.  
The term human security dates back to 1994 and the UNDP human development 
report, although the idea of a more human focused approach to security dates back 
much further (Kerr 2007: 92).  The report states:  
“Human security can be said to have two main aspects. It means, first, safety 
from such chronic threats as hunger, disease and repression. And second, it 
means protection from sudden and hurtful disruptions in the patterns of daily 
life-whether in homes, in jobs or in communities” (UNDP 1994: 23).  
I will argue throughout this thesis that climate change may indeed affect both these 
aspects; especially in the developing world. As I will demonstrate,  climate change can 
undermine human security. What is less clear is how this human insecurity leads to 
violent conflict (Barnett and Adger 2007). When the United Nations Security Council 
(UNSC) discusses climate change as a potential security threat, it shows that the 
possible security ramifications of climate change go beyond those of individual, 
human security. 
Throughout this thesis I will refer to this difference as security in the broad and narrow 
sense. Violent conflict, that will be in focus here, is still within the realm of the 
narrower, traditional security concept – where national security, power politics and 
war are keywords. Hence violent conflict is used as an expression for traditional 
security concerns. When I on the other hand refer to a broader notion of security, this 
encompasses other security concerns, especially human security; where the referent is 
the individual rather than the state. Human security is an important part of the climate 
change – security debate, but this is not the security concept in focus here. What this 
thesis seeks to explore is  how climate change may be a threat to security in the 
narrower, more traditional meaning of the word, through increasing conflict risk.  
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2 Climate change 
2.1 Climate change and its causes  
Increasingly on both the local and international political agenda, climate change has 
become a well-known concept; with the focus that politicians, scientists, the media, 
humanitarian organizations and a wide array of others give to the climate change 
debate, it has indeed become difficult to overlook. There are three main levels in this 
debate. First of all, the climate change debate evolves around if and how much the 
climate is in fact changing. In spite of a few sceptics still questioning the factuality and 
severity of climate change, evidence has long ago convinced most that climate change 
is real. With a temperature increase that in the past century alone stands for a roughly 
7 to 12  % of the total change in the last 18000 years or so (Homer Dixon 1999: 60), it 
seems easy to conclude that something extraordinary is going on. Related to the 
increasing temperatures, climate change also manifests itself through changes in 
precipitation, more unpredictable weather and an intensification of climatic natural 
hazards like for instance storms (Bernauer et al. 2010: 4). Due to the amount of 
evidence indicating an actual change in the climate, the debate has shifted focus in the 
recent years from whether the climate is changing, to whether the observed changes 
can be attributed to human activity (Gartzke 2010: 3).  
Secondly, then, the debate also includes a causal aspect, regarding human activities 
role in the observed changes. The causes of climate change are not as easy to identify 
as its factuality, yet there seems to be a general consensus that human activities do 
play a central role in the observed changes, although some few still believe that these 
changes are just part of the natural cycle. The International Panel On Climate Change 
(IPCC) has the function of collecting and objectively reviewing serious research on 
climate change and its physiological and biological effects from scientists all over the 
world, and is perhaps the most important source laying the premises for the climate 
change debate (Nordås and Gleditsch 2007: 629). In the IPCC fourth assessment report 
it is clearly stated that it is very likely, defined as from 90 to 99 % certain, that climate 
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change is at least partly human induced, or put differently; that it is extremely unlikely 
(<5%) that the global pattern of warming observed during the past half century can be 
explained without external forcing (Solomon et al. 2007: 86). This human activity is 
often linked to the blooming of industrialization over the past century, that have led to 
a significant increase in carbon dioxide emissions primarily from the burning of fossil 
fuels, at the same time as extensive deforestation. This has created excess in 
greenhouse gases, which again warms up the earth (Le Treut et al. 2007: 115). This 
warming has a strong causal role in other observed climate change indicators too, like 
more extreme and unpredictable weather, and changes in precipitation patterns (see 
Schreck and Semazzi 2004, Boko et al. 2007).  
While it is difficult to establish the exact role human activities play in the observed 
changes in the climate, this is not important for the purposes of this thesis. The focus 
here will be on the third level of the climate change debate, namely the consequences 
of climate change. It should therefore be sufficient to note that there is little doubt 
among scholars that human activity over the past century or so is one of the drivers of 
the observed climate change, and this is attributed mainly to the aforementioned 
industrialization and emissions of fossil fuels.  
Also the consequences of climate change are difficult to establish exactly.  Isolating 
the effects that climatic factors have on the natural system, or even worse; on human 
systems, is no easy task. Still, changes in temperature, precipitation and the frequency 
and strength of natural hazards are bound to have an effect on the environment, and 
there is a general consensus on some of these effects.   
2.2 Environmental effects 
The natural environment can be very vulnerable to the factors associated with climatic 
change. Most people that have ever dealt with a plant would know that both the 
temperature and the correct amount of water are crucial for the plants survival. Give it 
too much water, and the plant will die. Give it too little water, and the result is the 
same. The same logic is of course valid for the natural environment, and changes in 
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the climate will also lead to environmental changes. In much of the literature a 
distinction is made between slow onset and rapid onset environmental changes (NRC 
2009, Brown and McLeman 2009: 293).  
What is commonly referred to as slow onset natural changes, means alterations in the 
natural environment that forms over time. These include drought, desertification and 
sea level rise. Climatological factors like warming can cause several such slow onset 
changes. Higher average temperatures have for instance caused large changes in the 
cryosphere, the part of the planet where water is in solid form. The cryosphere on land 
stores about 75% of the world’s freshwater (Lemke et al. 2007: 341). These changes 
include a decrease or melting of permafrost, permanent snow covers like that of mount 
Kilimanjaro, ice caps and glaciers. The two latter have contributed to sea level rise that 
threaten biological systems – and human societies – in coastal zones. While the 
average sea level rise has been 1.7 to 1.8 mm per year in the last century, this number 
has drastically jumped to a 3 mm per year in the last ten years (Rosenzweig et al. 
2007: 92). This has huge implications for coastal zones where the rising level of the 
oceans is threatening to flood cultivable land and make large stretches of what is today 
habitable coastal land inhabitable. Underwater ecosystems too are increasingly at risk, 
for instance through the bleaching of coral reefs and decline in fish stocks.  This is 
mainly due to warming of the oceans, but in some places the under water ecosystems 
are also being disturbed by an increasing freshening of the seas; a result of polar ice 
melting.  
Terrestrial biological systems are suffering the consequences of climate change as 
well. Both changes in temperatures and changes in rainfall patterns can have 
devastating effects on fragile ecological systems. It has been estimated that with a 
temperature increase of only 1.5 – 2.5 degrees, up to 30 % of the worlds plant and 
animal species will be at increased risk of extinction (Buhaug et al. 2008: 8). Africa 
has a variety of different ecosystems, from rainforests to desert, which are all 
vulnerable to changes (Boko et al. 2007). Among the concerns are especially increased 
drought, desertification and the loss of fertile land and as an effect; both plant and 
animal species.  Additionally, rising sea level pose a direct threat to coastal zones and 
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especially small island states (see Kinnas 2005), not only through the flooding of 
cropland and other terrestrial biological systems, but also to the extent where some 
island states may actually be at risk of eventually being lost to the sea.  
Often associated with extreme weather events, rapid onset natural changes come 
suddenly and often unexpectedly. These are both in themselves extreme weather 
events, such as storm, and the consequences of extreme weather, like flooding, and are 
associated with what is commonly referred to as natural disasters. According to a 
recent report from the Norwegian Refugee Council (NRC 2009: 5), the number of 
recorded natural disasters has doubled from about 200 to over 400 per year over the 
past 20 years. Flooding as well as landslides is often a result of heavy rain; making 
precipitation patterns central in causing rapid onset natural hazards, as well as the 
aforementioned slow onset ones.  Flooding for instance is often more common where 
periods of drought are followed by heavy rain. In these cases, the dry land is unable to 
absorb the water, which may contribute to the severity of the flooding. Both flooding 
and landslides can leave large areas uncultivable, and may also destroy infrastructure.  
2.3 Social effects 
There are several severe social consequences of these environmental changes – and it 
is these that are the hypothesized connecting link between climate change and violent 
conflict.  First of all, rapid onset natural changes - landslides, storms and flooding -can 
pose a direct threat to human lives. Every year thousands of people die as a direct 
result of natural disasters, and millions more are affected. At the time of writing, a 
flood in Pakistan has left at least 1200 people dead, with another 6 million affected to 
the point where they are in acute need of food, shelter, clean water and healthcare (UN 
2010). Just in 2010, deadly landslides have been reported from China to Uganda and 
Mexico, demonstrating the global reach of weather related tragedies.  
The second major social effect can also be lethal; a potential decrease in clean water 
accessibility. According to UNESCO, 340 million people in sub Saharan Africa lack 
access to clean drinking water (Hendrix and Salehyan 2010: 2), and with more 
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widespread extreme weather this number is threatening to increase. In some future 
scenarios, the predicted number of additional people in risk of water stress in Africa by 
2020 is between 75 and 200 million (Boko et al. 2007: 445). 
Thirdly, a decrease in agricultural productivity because of destruction of cropland, can 
seriously affect another vital source of life: food. In 2004, 230 million people were 
undernourished in Africa alone (Brown and Crawford 2009: 16), reflecting that the 
need for an increase in food production and distribution is massive. In addition to fresh 
water for drinking and household use, water is a critical input for agriculture and 
industry (Hendrix and Salehyan 2010: 1), and hence for food production. 
This decrease in agricultural productivity also affect peoples livelihood (Buhaug et al. 
2008). In some African countries up to 70 % of the population live off the land, and 
many will have difficulties in finding other sources of income. Climate change may in 
other words exacerbate poverty. Clean water is also key to parts of the industry, 
especially manufacturing.  A decrease in productivity, both in agriculture and 
manufacturing, poses serious challenges for economic productivity, not only on an 
individual level but also on a national and regional level. Agriculture represents 
between 20 and 30 % of GDP in sub-Saharan Africa, and make up 55 % of the total 
value of the export (Brown and Crawford 2009: 10).  
A decline in food production can lead to both malnutrition and hunger, and lack of 
water and dehydration is lethal. But human health can be affected by climate change in 
other ways as well. When it comes to diseases in Africa, in addition to HIV/AIDS, 
malaria is one of the largest threats to human lives. According to the World Health 
Organization (WHO), malaria stands for about 20 % of child deaths in Africa, with 
one child dying from the disease every 45 seconds (WHO 2010). In parts of East 
Africa, the documented incidents of malaria have increased since 1970. For instance in 
Kenya, the malaria vectors seem to have spread to the highlands that were malaria free 
only 20 years ago (Rosenzweig et al. 2007: 108), a human tragedy that is attributed to 
changes in both temperature and precipitation. Furthermore, lack of access to 
freshwater as a result of both sea level rise and heavy precipitation (Easterling et al. 
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2007: 298) can spread deadly diseases like cholera, as seen in the aftermath of the 
devastating earthquake in Haiti in 2010.  
Also the destruction of infrastructure, mainly from rapid onset events, has its social 
implications. Where thousands of people lose their homes at the same time, even if 
only temporarily, it is easy to argue that these circumstances may nurture despair, 
large migrations, and an intensified immediate competition over both shelter, food, 
limited on-scene medical care, and in the long run also jobs (Reuveny 2007).  
2.3.1 Vulnerability 
While climate change may definitely contribute heavily to the abovementioned social 
challenges, it cannot be seen in isolation from other factors. A natural hazard becomes 
a natural disaster when it has severe negative impacts on human settlements. When the 
infrastructure and general degree of development is low, a relatively small storm can 
cause great damage. Both slow and rapid onset disasters vary in severity depending on 
where they take place.  As Barnett (2003: 5) notes, if it was only about biophysical 
risk, Japan would be as vulnerable to climate change as Papua New Guinea. The social 
effects of climate change are thus not caused by climate change alone, but are also 
linked to vulnerability. IPCC has defined vulnerability in this regard as a combination 
of three interrelated elements: exposure, sensitivity and adaptive capacity (Kinnas 
2005: 5). While exposure denotes the degree to which one is affected by the purely 
physical impact of a changing climate, the two latter refers to how resistant a society is 
to the negative effects of these natural phenomena. Put simply, level of sensitivity 
determines the degree of damages, and adaptive capacity how well the society is able 
to adapt to the negative effects.  
Since Africa has played a small role in the human driven causes of climate change, it 
is a paradox that the continent is the most vulnerable to its effects. This is because of 
the multiple stresses and the generally low adaptive capacity (Boko et al. 2007: 435, 
Brown et al. 2007: 1145). These multiple stresses, that determine the degree of 
sensitivity, often concern pre-existing environmental degradation, low levels of 
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socioeconomic development, and political instability. Especially in Sub Saharan 
Africa, poverty is widespread, and millions of people are already suffering from water 
stress, malnutrition and other struggles that can be directly linked to the environment 
(Brown and Crawford 2009). The low level of economic prosperity and development 
also put strains on the continents adaptive capacity, making them even more 
vulnerable to extreme weather events and the negative social effects of climate change. 
Together, these factors can lead to disturbances in human settlements on a large scale. 
Of special concern is how this can contribute to mass migrations. According to the 
IPCC fourth assessment report, 150 million people may be displaced in the context of 
climate change by 2050 (NRC 2009: 6). The argument is that a decline in access or 
availability of vital resources put pressure on people and leads to intensified 
competition over the remaining resources. If large areas of what is now relatively 
fertile land are damaged by drought, flood or other hazards, this may force millions of 
people to relocate, which again will put more stress on the host communities (see 
Reuveny 2007).  It is for these unfortunate reasons Africa is a preferred subject of 
analysis in this study field; because of the continents relative vulnerability to climate 
change, it is likely to provide more answers regarding the climate change– conflict 
nexus than any other part of the world.  
I have thus far focused on what climate change is, and what the consequences are. I 
will now shift focus to show how climate change can be related to conflict through the 
social effects mentioned in the previous section, and provide a theoretical and 
empirical framework for the assumptions that will be tested later on. The following 
section offers an assessment of how rainfall may affect stability and conflict, and posit 
three specific hypotheses regarding this relationship. Then, the dataset and statistical 
methods will be presented, before carrying out the statistical analyses and discussing 
the findings.  
13 
 
3 Relating climate change to conflict 
3.1 Theoretical perspectives 
The previous section leaves little doubt that climate change, through natural hazards 
and environmental changes can have significant negative impacts on human beings, 
both at the individual and societal level. It even remains clear that climate change can 
in fact undermine human security, through posing a direct threat on human lives.  Yet 
that is not to say that it is a significant contributor to conflict.  
When it comes to making the link between environmental degradation and conflict, the 
idea is by no means a new one. The environment – conflict debate has been going on 
for at least two centuries already, and hence dates back to long before climate change 
was on the political agenda. Although there are different perspectives regarding the 
causal mechanisms leading from environmental factors to violent conflict, the main 
argument is that environmental factors affect resources on which humans depend, 
which again intensifies competition over resources and triggers human reactions that 
increase the risk of conflict.  
This argument is in line with the neo - Malthusian perspective, that base its ideas on 
the theoretical legacy of Thomas Malthus, a British economist whose writings date 
back to the late eighteenth century.  His main argument was that exponential 
population growth would eventually lead to a greater demand than supply in food 
production, meaning that the planet would no longer be able to provide for human 
needs (Kahl 2006: 4, Homer Dixon 1999: 29). Under certain circumstances, the 
increased competition that arises over the remaining and scarce resources could lead to 
violent conflict.  
For the purposes of this thesis, there are mainly two ways this can happen in 
accordance with the neo Malthusian view. The deprivation hypothesis argues that 
population growth, environmental degradation, and an uneven distribution of resources 
produce relative deprivation among the poor. As competition for natural and economic 
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resources increases, so does the risk of violence (Kahl 2006: 9). The state failure 
hypothesis, on the other hand, claims that this only happens when the state is too weak 
to prevent the deprivation from turning in to conflict. Strong states will often be able to 
stop this from happening either through providing relief for aggrieved individuals, or 
through coercion (ibid: 10).  In this view, organized violence is only likely when 
environmental degradation and population pressure are combined with a weak state. If 
the system is able to at least partially meet the demands of deprived citizens, the 
chances of violence and conflict is believed to decrease.  
As a leading scholar in the environmental scarcity literature, Thomas Homer Dixon, 
has a central role in this debate. Together with the Toronto group1
Especially the first category is important for my purposes.  The reason for this follows 
a pretty straightforward logic; rainfall is directly linked to the supply of natural 
resources, while the two others are more determined by social factors. It is the supply-
induced scarcity that is closest related to environmental change (Homer Dixon 1999: 
8).   
, he has conducted 
numerous studies regarding resource scarcity and violent conflict (see Homer Dixon 
1991; 1994; 1999). Homer Dixon divides environmental scarcity into three categories; 
supply induced scarcity, demand induced scarcity and structural scarcity (ibid 1994). 
The first category refers to the cases where resources degrade faster than they are 
renewed, and the second one to cases where the demand for resources increase faster 
than the supply, especially altered by population pressure. The third category applies 
where the resource in question is concentrated in the hands of a few, typically the elite, 
while the rest of the population are experiencing resource shortages; in other words an 
unequal distribution of the resources (Homer Dixon 1999: 15).  
The three sources of scarcity do interact however, and the two other categories are not 
isolated form environmental change. For instance can demand-induced scarcity be a 
by-product of environmental change. The issue of so-called eco migration and climate 
                                                 
1 A common name for the group of conflict researchers at the University of Toronto, in which 
Homer Dixon is a central figure.   
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refugees is one of the primary concerns in the climate change – security debate.  The 
logic behind this concern is that as the problems originating in the competition over 
resources intensify, people will migrate en masse in search of better opportunities 
elsewhere. Reuveny (2007) argues that this eco-migration can put so much additional 
stress on the host areas i.e. where the environmental migrants arrive, that it can 
increase the risk of violence here as well, through the same mechanisms of resource 
competition. This is supported by the findings of Gleditsch and Salehyan (2006), 
indicating that refugees from neighbouring countries increase the risk of conflict. 
Hence following the argument of Reuveny,  environmental problems that might at first 
glance seem local can easily spread and lead to similar problems in neighbouring 
communities.  Reuveny`s case study of the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina shows that 
most of the people that were forced to leave, had at the time of writing in 2007 still not 
returned to their homes, showing that migration from extreme weather events is not 
just a short term trend. The potential effect this has on conflict is likely to be more 
prominent in less developed countries  – a presumption that is also backed by evidence 
from his case study of Bangladesh (Reuveny 2007: 5).  
Structural scarcity, on the other hand, refers to a context where there is a severe 
imbalance in the distribution of wealth and of access to resources, and this imbalance 
often has its roots in class and ethnic relations  (Homer Dixon 1999: 15) . It is possible 
to imagine that structural scarcity too is influenced by the supply of a resource, but 
with the competition over resources being between the elite and the rest, rather than 
between groups, and where the elite ensures its own survival effectively blocking the 
access of others to the resources. A related example is found in a study of the Middle 
East, where one of the concerns is that environmental degradation will lead to 
increased militarization with armed military guarding for instance water wells (Brown 
and Crawford 2009b). It should be noted that although Homer Dixon is clear in his 
view that climate change can lead social disturbances on a large enough scale to cause 
violence and conflict, he does not believe that climate change alone causes this. It is 
only in combination with social factors that climate change becomes a security risk.  
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Despite their prominent position in the environment – conflict debate, neither Thomas 
Homer-Dixon nor the neo Malthusian perspective in general has gone un-criticized. 
The opponents hold that the causal mechanisms proposed by the neo Malthusians are 
too elaborate, that the supporting literature tends to draw its conclusions based on case 
studies that are selected on the dependent variable, and that the perspective all in all is 
too pessimistic (see Urdal 2005; Nordås and Gleditsch  2007; Hendrix and Glasner 
2007).  
Differing from the Neo Malthusian view, neoclassical economists often assert that it is 
resource abundance rather than scarcity that creates social instability (Kahl 2006: 14). 
Scholars supporting this view argue that states are able to adapt to this resource 
scarcity, and question the argument that population growth and environmental 
degradation necessarily leads to resource scarcity. Compared to the neo Malthusian 
perspective, neoclassical economists are far more optimistic when it comes to the 
effects population growth can have on society.  
As the name indicates, this perspective focus attention on economics, and draws 
inferences about the resources - conflict link by emphasizing the economy of 
resources. But simply, it is about greed rather than grievance (Kahl 2006: 15). 
According to the honey pot hypothesis, abundant supplies of valuable natural resources 
create incentives for conflict groups to form, and to fight in order to capture these 
resources; profit seeking motivates and empowers insurgents in resource rich countries 
(ibid). In a different manner, the resource curse hypothesis blames the tendency 
especially developing states have to rely too heavily on the export of natural resources, 
thereby tying their economy too much to a fragile and volatile market. Not only does 
this leave the national economy extremely vulnerable to shifting trends in the 
international market, concentrating both capital and labour in one sector, but it also 
undermines other economic sectors important to the society (Kahl 2006; Homer Dixon 
1999).  An often-mentioned example of economic sectors that suffer from this over 
reliance on the export of resources is labour intense manufacturing, which is of 
particular importance to many developing countries. It is when the prices of the 
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commodity drop and markets “crash” that the social effects believed to increase the 
risk of conflict can become prominent.  
These views, however different they may seem, are not necessarily contradicting. They 
can in fact coexist (Urdal 2005: 419).  Renner (2002: 9) argues that environmentally 
induced resource scarcity first and foremost concerns resources that cannot easily be 
traded. Although, as mentioned, agriculture stands for about half of Africa’s export, I 
dare to argue that the neo classical economist arguments are more valid for resources 
like diamonds, gold and coal, due to the quantity – worth ratio on these relative to 
agricultural goods. Neo Malthusian perspectives on the other hand, mainly focus on 
resources covering basic needs (Hendrix and Salehyan 2010). This leaves the 
neoclassical economist view more applicable to lucrative resources associated with 
wealth, and the neo Malthusian perspective more applicable to natural resources 
directly linked to food production. Although the neo Malthusian perspective is not a 
main focus of this thesis then, it is nevertheless difficult to avoid that many of the 
arguments here will follow the same line of thoughts as those belonging to neo 
Malthusian literature, since the type of resources that are likely to be affected by rain 
are those central to this view.  
The distinction between these theoretical perspectives, although not necessarily 
contradictory, nevertheless provides a good theoretical background for the empirical 
literature.  
3.2 Empirical background and hypotheses 
In the numerous empirical studies on the climate change – conflict link, theory does 
not always have a central role. The quantitative literature is driven more by empirical 
than theoretical background, which may not be all that strange since they are after all 
empirical studies.  Yet this means that perhaps unlike in many other branches of social 
sciences and political science, there are no clearly outlined theories driving the debate, 
but rather a combination of underlying theoretical assumptions linked to the literature 
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mentioned in the previous chapter, discipline affiliation, and methodological 
preferences.  
While the theoretical assumptions regarding the influence of the environment on 
conflict are well embedded in literature, the empirical evidence in this field is far from 
convincing (Salehyan 2008). There seems to be a divide between the empirical, 
quantitative literature and qualitative case studies when it comes to findings. The non-
statistical studies in this field do for the most part agree that climate change should be 
seen as a security threat, and that it has had, or will in the future have, a direct and 
significant influence on conflict. This branch of the literature consists both of case 
studies (see Homer Dixon; Kahl 2006; Brown and McLeman 2009, Reuveny 2007) 
and of reports based on other studies, aiming to warn about future effects (see Brown 
and Crawford 2009b, Barnett and Adger 2007, Buhaug et al. 2008). The problem, 
however, arises when attempts are made to statistically support these links.  
3.2.1 Rainfall and conflict 
In the quantitative, statistical literature, the findings regarding the link from 
environmental factors to violent conflict are inconclusive. This inconclusiveness can 
be partly due to the fact that the very nature of this type of study assumes a 
simplification of reality and may overlook important mechanisms. Different outcomes 
in the various analyses is also closely related to operationalization and measurement. 
In the wider context of the debate, both climate change and security, or even conflict, 
are difficult concepts to clearly define and operationalize. This entails that the related 
literature encompasses a variety of studies measuring slightly different mechanisms. 
Only small differences in design in terms of aggregation level and measurement seems 
to give very different results. Among the studies of so called slow onset environmental 
changes, there are mainly three explored paths from climate change to conflict; 
through neo Malthusian indicators of scarcity, through testing climatic parameters 
directly, and through economic indicators.  
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Slow onset:  
Much of the slow-onset literature assesses the neo Malthusian scarcity – conflict 
nexus. In 1998, Hauge and Ellingsen conducted one of the very first large N studies in 
this study area. Looking to test the model of Homer Dixon, they applied typical neo 
Malthusian indicators like land degradation and low freshwater availability to 
determine the impact these had on conflict. Although they found economic and 
political factors to be more determining than environmental factors, their results did 
show that countries experiencing environmental degradation were more prone to 
conflict (Hauge and Ellingsen 1998). Yet despite the pioneering status of this research, 
it was a few years later shown that their study was not replicable (Theisen 2006). 
Theisen was not only unable to replicate the study, a serious blow to the reliability of 
the Hauge and Ellingsen study,  but when he used his own data to test the same 
hypotheses, he found very little support for these (ibid). This is consistent with 
findings from similar studies as well. Urdal finds some evidence of increased conflict 
where land scarcity combines with high population growth, but these results are not 
very robust (Urdal 2005).  Raleigh and Urdal (2007) too look typical neo Malthusian 
factors like freshwater availability, land degradation and population density to see how 
these affect conflict. The study is one of the first to look at these factors on a sub 
national level rather than a country level, yet their findings too are somewhat 
inconclusive. While their results indicate some effect from the environmental and 
demographic indicators on conflict, the impacts are far outweighed by economic and 
political factors.  
To be able to identify the effect of the environment, and especially climate change, on 
conflict, going via resource scarcity may not be sufficient. As seen from the different 
social effects climate change can have, resources are undoubtedly an important 
component, yet can not alone bear the entire argument of a potential link between 
climate change and conflict. Several of the typical neo Malthusian measures are not 
exogenous to human activity (Bernauer et al. 2010: 15), hence these indicators do not 
only capture climatic conditions. Several other studies test climatic variables more 
directly, without going through indicators of scarcity. The most popular hypothesis in 
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this regard seems to be that decreased rainfall and drought will increase the risk of 
conflict, which often takes the shape of civil war. One study that combines this with 
what they term long term trends, referring to what I have named neo Malthusian 
indicators like land degradation and freshwater availability, is that of Hendrix and 
Glasner (2007). Both for these indicators, and for their trigger variable rainfall, they 
find a significant impact on conflict, albeit not in the absence of economic and 
political variables. This is consistent with the notion of vulnerability as a key aspect to 
understanding the effects of climate change.  Finding the trigger variable to be of 
higher significance than the trend variables, the authors conclude that their findings 
indicate that drier years increase the risk of conflict. Consistent with this, Levy et al. 
(2005), whose research is on a global scale, but sub national level, show that the 
likelihood of high intensity conflict is higher in years following a year with rainfall 
levels significantly below normal.  
These findings however are not representative of the general findings in this literature. 
Arguing against those who have blamed the crisis in Darfur on environmental 
degradation and drought especially, Keavane and Grey (2008) find no evidence of 
such a correlation for the breakout of conflict in Darfur in 2003. Rather, they argue 
that since there was no sign of decreased rainfall in the years prior to 2003, drought 
and lack of rainfall could not have been contributing factors to the conflict. In a recent 
study Buhaug and Theisen (2010) also test if drought is associated with civil war risk 
among African states, using a selection of parameters of precipitation (Buhaug and 
Theisen 2010: 9-10). Their analysis does not uncover any relationship between 
rainfall, or drought, and conflict risk. The same authors, this time with a little help 
from a friend, also look for any potential impact of drought on conflict on the sub 
national level. Using much of the same or similar data, but with a spatially 
disaggregated dataset for Africa, does not help the conclusion. Again, their study fails 
to uncover any such relationship, concluding that the causes of civil war are political 
rather than environmental (Theisen et al. 2010). Could they be looking at the wrong 
indicators of climate change? Burke (et al. 2009) finds temperature to be a more robust 
measure than precipitation, and that warming does indeed increase the likelihood of 
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civil war in Africa. These findings uncover that precipitation and temperature are 
negatively correlated, which according to them may indicate that studies looking at 
drier years partially capture the effects of warmer years (Burke et al. 2009: 20672). 
Yet this conclusion is not necessarily correct, at least not in the case of east Africa. 
Schreck and Semazzi (2004) have found a dipole pattern in Africa in ENSO (El Niño – 
Southern oscillation) induced rainfall anomalies (ibid: 682). It seems that the eastern 
parts of the continent experience an increase in rainfall in response to warm ENSO 
events, with the opposite pattern for the rest of Africa. If this is true, then it could be 
that, at least  in east Africa, warmer years and drier years do not correspond. Their 
findings furthermore indicate that east African rainfall is consistent with global 
warming, meaning the region may experience an increase in rainfall as the average 
temperatures rise. This is supported by other studies as well (see Hulme et al. 2001 ). 
In the case of east Africa then, climate change could mean more rain rather than less, 
making the latter alone an inadequate indicator if we want to see how climate change 
affects conflict in this region.  
Although for slightly different reasons, Buhaug (2010) too disagrees with the 
conclusions of Burke et al. (2009). He has conducted a follow up study criticizing 
especially the dependent variable used by Burke et al. The indicator of conflict used in 
the original study is limited to civil wars with a thousand or more battle deaths, which 
leaves out smaller, but significant, conflicts. Changing their original dependent 
variable to encompass smaller armed conflicts as well (25 battle deaths), and adding 
some to their climate parameters, Buhaug once again finds other explanations of civil 
war to be more valid than environmental ones. He argues that civil wars in Africa can 
better be explained by structural and contextual conditions including political 
exclusion and poor national economy, yet his findings do show vague indications that 
major civil wars are more frequent in years following unusually wet years (Buhaug 
2010: 8). Given that there such a pattern is correct, then this is perhaps in line with 
what we might expect in the East African context.  
Burke et al. s study emphasises the role precipitation have in livelihood in Africa, and 
argues that it seems likely that variation in agricultural performance is the central 
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mechanism linking warming to conflict (Burke et al. 2009: 20672). This is related to a 
range of studies that assess the effect of climate change by going via economic factors. 
The general argument is that, especially in the African context, income and economic 
growth is closely correlated with weather shocks, due to the importance of agriculture 
to the economic sector.  Bernauer et al. (2010) seek to find out if climate change 
increases the risk of conflict, via economic growth. While the study does suggest some 
negative effects from climate change indicators on economic growth, and strong 
economic growth to have a negative effect on conflict, their results reflect the general 
observation in this literature: the effects are too weak and the findings are too vague to 
fully support the hypothesised impact of climate change on conflict. Years earlier 
however, in 2004, one study did find support for a similar view. Using rainfall shocks 
as an instrumental variable for economic growth, the infamous study of Miguel et al. 
found this to have strong significant influence on conflict. This much-cited study 
found that negative growth of rain increased significantly the risk of conflict in the 
following year, also indicating that more rainfall makes civil conflict less likely 
(Miguel et al. 2004: 737). As many others have hypothesised then, their findings 
indicate that drought increases the likelihood of conflict. Yet as the equally renowned 
work of Hauge and Ellingsen, and that of Burke et al., their study have been victim of 
failed attempts of replication. Ciccone (2010), strongly, and as I will argue; correctly, 
reacts to the way Miguel et al. measure rainfall. As many others, they measure 
precipitation patterns as change from the previous year, i.e. as annual growth. This 
approach has serious limitations. Because rainfall levels are strongly mean reverting, 
low growth need not reflect that current rainfall levels are low (ibid: 2). If one year 
experiences a strong increase in rainfall, then the next year can be measured with low 
or even negative growth even if it still rains more than average, given that it rains less 
than the previous year. When using the data from Miguel et al., Ciccone finds that if 
anything, the opposite of their conclusions is true in their data; conflict follows 
positive shocks, not negative ones (ibid). Hence operationalization and different causal 
paths seems to determine to what extent the various findings support the notion of 
climate change as influential in conflicts. When going via economic shocks, this 
literature assumes an indirect link that is highly dependent on other factors. What 
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studies like that of Bernauer et al. (2010) for instance, really fail to find is an effect 
from rainfall to economic growth. 
I further argue that an additional problem in the approach used by Miguel et al. (2004), 
and several others, is that their measurement of the climatic parameter rainfall does not 
capture intra annual extremes. As mentioned, changes in precipitation are related to 
both slow and rapid onset natural changes, and I strongly believe that they both need to 
be accounted for when we assess the impact climate change and especially rainfall 
have on conflict  
Rapid onset:  
I argue in this thesis that rainfall is a good indicator of climate change, among other 
reasons because it can be directly linked to both slow and rapid onset natural changes. 
Although a less explored field, some scholars have also specifically studied the 
relationship between rapid onset changes, understood as natural disasters, and conflict. 
Brancati (2007) conducts a statistical analysis of earthquakes in 185 countries, and her 
findings suggest that these can stimulate intrastate conflict by producing scarcities in 
basic resources. Although it is less certain that earthquakes are linked to climate 
change than is true for many other natural disasters, her arguments about rapid onset 
disasters are still valid here. The logic is intuitive; in occurring quickly and without 
warning, rapid onset disasters are more likely to provoke acute feelings of frustration 
arising from relative deprivation than those linked to slow onset changes, such as 
droughts (Brancati 2007: 716).  Her arguments can be seen in connection with the neo 
Malthusian deprivation hypothesis, since existing inequality in the distribution of 
resources is likely to be exacerbated in these situations.   Of course, like with other 
environmental issues, the social consequences of disasters like earthquakes are often 
worse in areas where the general level of development is low. This is also in sync with 
her findings. A main mechanism in the potential relationship between rapid onset 
disaster and conflict is also that of intensified competition over resources. This is 
closely related to the neo Malthusian argument, but is valid for a broader spectre of 
resources than just the renewable natural ones.  In cases like those seen recently in 
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Pakistan and Haiti, where rapid onset disasters leads to millions losing their homes 
simultaneously, and the access to resources like food, medicine, shelter and freshwater 
is rapidly depleting, it is easy to imagine how violence may occur as a by-product of 
the desperate situation. In the long run it is furthermore possible to imagine how this 
can create negative sentiments towards the government and elite, if aid has not been 
provided in a satisfactory manner.  
Contrary to these conclusions however, Slettbak and DeSoysa (2010) find that 
countries with one or more disasters in the same or previous year are less likely to 
have an outbreak of conflict. They study the effects of a range of weather related 
indicators, including storms, floods, and drought, on conflict. Few of the indicators 
turn out significant; the only one that does is drought, reporting negative values (ibid: 
19). However, drought as defined in this thesis, is not a rapid onset disaster. The 
natural disasters in their data that here would be defined as climate related rapid onset 
disasters, landslides and flood, turn out with positive signs, although not statistically 
significant. Hence their findings do not necessarily contradict the conclusions of 
Brancati (2007), yet are nevertheless too ambiguous to support them.  
Summing up, it seems that just small variations in research design can make all the 
difference for a study’s findings regarding the influence climate change has on 
conflict. Posing slightly different questions, or the same question in a slightly different 
manner, gives such different results that the empirical literature as a whole does not 
render much support to this hypothesized link.  
We see that when rainfall has been used as an indicator of climate change, this has 
normally been based on the assumption that a decrease in rain, as an expression of 
drought, can lead to conflict. Yet the opposite may also be true. I believe both 
excessive rain and lack of rain can have an effect on conflict – because they both can 
have severe social implications. The issue with too much rain is not completely 
ignored by the literature2
                                                 
2 It is included by among others Miguel et al. 2004; Hendrix and Salehyan 2010; Buhaug and 
Theisen 2010. 
, but it has only rarely been in focus. The fact that so many of 
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these studies have done what Ciccone (2010) criticized Miguel et al. (2004) for, 
namely used a year to year change in precipitation amount as an indicator of rainfall 
variability, makes inferences about such a link problematic. Operationalizing shocks as 
percent change in annual rainfall can be misleading (Hendrix and Salehyan 2010: 13).  
In addition, when rain is the element of interest, it is not just about amount alone, but 
rather about amount and timing. A variable that focus on change in yearly amount says 
little about the pattern of the rainfall, and extreme weather conditions like a longer dry 
season and a wetter rainy season will not necessarily show when this approach is being 
used. Heavier rain in the rainy season, for instance, may contribute to normal annual 
amounts being reported in otherwise dry years, and lead to failed harvest as the rain 
comes too late, too early or too concentrated (Buhaug and Theisen 2010: 9). An 
additional reason to investigate the effect of too much rain is the special pattern found 
in east African climate. If it is true that this region is experiencing more rain due to 
warming – and will continue to experience more rain in all the different future SRES 
scenarios 3
It is my view then, that both sides of normal rainfall should be included– and that 
intra-annual changes as well should be accounted for – when studying the effect of 
rainfall on conflict. A similar approach is found in recent studies. Hendrix and 
Salehyan (2010) find rainfall variability to have significant influence on small- and 
large-scale political conflicts in Sub Saharan Africa, and argue that extreme deviations 
from normal rainfall patterns, droughts, and floods—which they collectively term 
hydro-meteorological disasters—may lead to social and political disorder. Including 
both excess and shortage of rain, and acknowledging the damage the first can do as 
well; they find a significant correlation between the hydro-meteorological disasters 
and conflict.  
(Hulme et al. 2001), then the effect of excessive rain too should be 
accounted for when studying this region.  
                                                 
3 SRES stands for Special Report on Emissions Scenarios, developed by the IPCC. The report 
has four scenario groups regarding future socio-economic and environmental development, 
which are used to model future climate change scenarios regarding changes in temperatures 
and the climate (see Hulme et al. 2001; IPCC 2007) 
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Based on these arguments, I formulate the first hypothesis to be tested statistically in 
this thesis:  
H1: extreme variations in rainfall are positively correlated with conflict.  
In line with the arguments leading to this hypothesis, it is expected that both negative 
and positive extremes may have an influence on conflict. Furthermore, it is also 
expected that especially positive precipitation values are associated with more rapid 
onset disasters, which could be more immediate in increasing conflict risk, through 
more rapidly creating feelings of despair. This way, extreme variations  includes 
aspects of both amount and timing.  
3.2.2 Rainfall and the nature of conflict 
There is another side to the definitional and methodological choices in much of the 
climate change – conflict literature worth taking into consideration. Most studies make 
inferences about this link by studying mainly conflict onset. They further seem to 
conclude that environmental factors are, if influential at all, never the main cause of a 
conflict. Still, for the most part, the main dependent variable of these studies remains 
conflict onset.  If environmental factors do not cause conflict, yet are still believed to 
impact conflict, it seems a logical choice to study other sides of conflict in addition to 
its onset. Climatic factors, even when failed to prove important for creating conflict,  
may still influence already ongoing ones. To draw conclusions about the influence 
climate change has on conflict through only consider conflict onset, is in my view not 
satisfactory.  
Although not as often, similar arguments have been made. Hauge and Ellingsen 
explored the severity of conflict, using a continuous dependent variable measuring 
number of battle deaths as percentage of entire population (Hauge and Ellingsen 1998: 
305). Although their findings should be interpreted with caution,  they did find 
indications that greater land degradation and population pressure, and lower freshwater 
availability, increases conflict severity.  Their data on battle deaths only covers major 
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civil wars, and the study  has lost some credibility due to the aforementioned failed 
replication  (Theisen 2006). Yet the theoretical argument remains interesting.  
Brown and Crawford argue that climate change could intensify land-use conflicts and 
trigger environmental migration by exacerbating existing environmental crises (2009: 
1). Furthermore, according to the same authors, a clear connection has been identified 
between natural disasters and the intensification of conflict (ibid: 21). If climate 
change does in fact have an influence on conflict, then there is no reason why this 
should not be true for conflict intensification. It may in fact be argued that it should be 
more noticeable on conflict intensity. The threshold for the outbreak of a new conflict 
is arguably higher than for the intensification of an ongoing one.   
As seen, the majority of the relevant literature in this field tends to focus on conflict 
onset. Yet to assess the causal relationship between climate change and conflict, the 
onset of new conflicts is not the only interesting component; the possibility that 
climate change may affect the nature of ongoing conflicts should also be explored 
H2: Rainfall variability has more impact on conflict intensity than on conflict 
onset 
Based on the arguments made, I expect the relationship between rainfall variability 
and conflict intensity to be stronger than that of rainfall variability and conflict onset; 
as the threshold that is likely to be present in the outbreak of conflicts does not 
influence intensification of existing conflicts.  
3.2.3 Rainfall and vulnerability 
As mentioned in section 2.3.1, climate change does not operate alone in creating the 
harmful effects on human societies believed to increase the risk of conflict.  Not only 
are there several alternative explanations for the outbreak and intensification of 
conflict and civil war, certain social aspects are also believed to interplay with climate 
change and determine the strength of the effect this has on conflict. It is mainly non- 
climatic factors that will determine whether climate change moves from being merely 
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a development challenge to presenting a security threat (Brown and Crawford 
2009:23).  There are two such factors that will be of interest here; ethnicity and 
vulnerability. While it can be argued that ethnicity should be seen as part of 
vulnerability through increasing sensitivity, for reasons of simplicity,  I choose to treat 
this as a different component.  
In the context of violence in Africa, ethnicity is often believed to play a central role 
(Homer Dixon 1999; Kahl 2006; Theisen 2010). This can be explained in terms of the 
artificial nature of African state borders. These were to a large extent determined by 
European powers who divided the continent between them without taking ethnic and 
national compositions into consideration (Henderson 2008; Easterly and Levine; 
Robinson 2009). Thus, African states differ form the traditional nation state, and are in 
general more ethnically diverse than states elsewhere (Fearon 2004).  Ethnic diversity, 
in turn, makes nation building more difficult than it would be with a culturally 
homogenous group (Robinson 2009), and identities are often more linked to ethnical 
belonging than nationality, perhaps unlike what is common in the western world. 
Ethnically based political parties are common (Fearon 2004), and the importance of 
ethnical belonging can even be traced to the realm of foreign politics where loyalty to 
ethnical background is high even across state boarders (Davies and Moore 1997).  The 
within-state ethnical diversity that arose from the sharing of the continent is also 
believed by some to have laid the premise for conflict between ethnical groups in the 
aftermath of independence (Easterly and Levine: 1214).   The continent has 
experienced several so called ethnical conflicts, with genocides like that in Rwanda 
being among the most chilling examples. The background for this conflict is of course 
far too complex to be blamed on ethnical cleavages alone, but it nevertheless proves 
how ethnic affiliation may come into play when societies are on the edge. Although 
not on the same scale as the Rwandan genocide, interplaying with environmental 
factors, I believe ethnicity may increase conflict risk. Environmental change could 
aggravate ethnical cleavages (Homer Dixon 1991), which again may increase the 
likelihood of conflict.   Furthermore, stress on local environmental conditions, either 
through slow or rapid onset natural changes, could increase the likelihood of 
29 
 
intergroup encounters. As water wells dry out, for instance, and people have to go 
further away in order to get hold of water, the likelihood of having to share the 
resource with other groups increases.  This argument follows the neo Malthusian 
perspective in that environmental degradation, interacting with population pressure, 
leads to the competition over scarce resources. My argument is further based on the 
expectation that it is easier to fight people belonging to a different group than yourself, 
and when the primary identity is linked to ethnic belonging rather than nationality, this 
may further increase the risk of intergroup violence within the boarders of a state. In a 
sense, then, ethnic diversity is here hypothesized to increase the sensitivity of an area 
to the negative social consequences of climate change.  
As previously mentioned, vulnerability is a product of three interrelated factors: 
exposure, sensitivity and adaptive capacity (Kinnas 2009: 5). Kinnas defines exposure 
as the degree to which a human group or ecosystem comes into contact with particular 
stresses, sensitivity as the degree to which a system will respond to a given change in 
climate including beneficial and harmful effects, and adaptive capacity as ability or 
capacity of a system to modify or change its characteristics or behaviour so as to cope 
getter with existing or anticipated external stresses (ibid).  Together, the three are 
crucial in understanding the effect climate change will have on societies. Again, had it 
been only about biophysical risk, several developed countries would be as vulnerable 
to the effects of climate change as many developing countries now are (Barnett 2003).   
The first of the three then, exposure, refers mainly to the purely biophysical risk. This 
depends directly on the geographical and climatic factors, which naturally includes 
rainfall. So my main hypotheses regard the effect of exposure, the purely climatic 
conditions. Yet exposure is clearly not enough to explain if and how societies are 
affected by climate change.  
Sensitivity relates to the degree to which human and biological systems are impacted 
by these conditions. This in turn, depends on numerous other elements like 
infrastructure, existing natural hazards and dependence on agriculture, to mention a 
few (Boko et al. 2007). The effects of a drought will be more devastating where the 
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natural environment is already under pressure, and a flood will sooner have 
ramifications on a village built from more traditional materials and tools than a on a 
concrete jungle. Furthermore, I have argued that ethnicity can be seen in connection 
with sensitivity; in increasing the sensitivity to conflict as a result of climate and 
environmental change.  
Finally, adaptive capacity denotes the ability - and will - of a society to adapt to the 
damaging effects of climate change. This can be the diversification of agricultural 
products or the migration or mass movement of people in incidences of rapid onset 
disasters like floods (Boko et al. 2007: 454). Barnett (2003) connects the likelihood 
and intensity of conflict to time available for adaptive capacity. Logic suggests that the 
longer it takes for a society to adapt to the consequences and come up with solutions to 
relief its citizens of the economic and social burdens of climate change, the higher the 
risk of conflict.  
These three overlap, mutually enforce one another, and are sometimes difficult to 
distinguish. Because vulnerability is such a complex phenomenon, it can be hard to 
measure and quantify (Adger 2006), yet as I will return to; I will use the two latter 
concepts as guidelines to my analysis when I determine the effect climate change has 
on violent conflict.  
H3: the strength of the effect of rainfall variability on conflict depends on level of 
vulnerability  
To summarize then, three hypotheses will be statistically analysed in order to study the 
relationship between climate change, understood as variations in rainfall, and conflict 
in Africa. These are founded in arguments based on the empirical literature, as well as 
on the theoretical background presented in this chapter.  The first hypothesis is based 
on the expectation that both high and low levels of rainfall may influence conflict risk. 
While previous studies tend to focus mainly on the latter, I argue that excess in rainfall 
and rapid onset environmental changes too should be accounted for when studying this 
link. The second hypothesis states that this relationship should be more noticeable on 
conflict intensity than conflict onset, due to the expected relatively lower threshold for 
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a conflict to intensify than for a conflict to break out. And finally, the third hypothesis 
presumes that these effects will be influenced by level of vulnerability. The latter term 
is understood to also include ethnic diversity, as this is expected to increase sensitivity 
to conflict, and be influenced by climate change as well.  Before statistically analysing 
these hypotheses in chapter 5, a thorough description of how this is to be done will be 
given.  
32 
 
4 Research design and data 
“ Good, scientific research can be qualitative or quantitative in style, but in 
design it has four characteristics in common; the goal is inference, the 
procedures are public, the conclusions are uncertain and the content is the 
method” (King et al. 1994: 8) 
In order to study the theoretical assumptions motivating this thesis, a solid research 
design is needed. A research design is a detailed plan of how the research question is 
answered, and how the empirical analysis is structured (Skog 2004: 69).  Here, 
statistical methods will be applied to answer the research question. This entails the 
expectation that the theoretical concepts that have been  outlined are measurable, and 
is likely to have implications for my findings; as mentioned methodological choices 
seems to be crucial in understanding why different studies end up with  different 
findings. Aiming to ensure the characteristics referred to by King et al. (1994), this 
chapter will provide a detailed overview of the how’s and whys regarding 
methodological choices in this thesis.  
To  statistically study the relationship between rainfall and armed conflict, I have 
constructed a dataset of 43 African countries south of Sahara covering the year’s 1981- 
2002, using data stemming from Buhaug (2010), Burke et al. (2009), the Social Polity 
dataset from the Quality of Government institute at the University of Gothenburg 
(Samanni et al.  2010), and the  Emergency events database (EM-Dat) by the Centre 
for Research on the Epidemiology of Disasters (CRED) (2010).  This provides a 
dataset with  890 observations in the main analysis. There are several steps to my 
analysis, and two different regression methods will be used; one for conflict onset and 
one for conflict intensity.  
The research question that drives this thesis is whether extreme changes in rainfall, 
affects violent conflict. Both a major positive change and a major negative change in 
precipitation are expected to increase the probability of conflict. The effects are 
expected to be larger on conflict intensity than onset, and larger when interplaying 
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with variables of vulnerability. It is furthermore  expected that a different pattern 
might be found in East Africa than the rest of the continent due to the different 
climatological patterns of this region. Therefore I will run a selection of east African 
countries in a separate analysis, to compare the results to those of Sub Saharan Africa 
as a whole. If there is indeed a correlation between higher rainfall levels and conflict, 
this pattern might be more prominent in East Africa than Africa in general, although 
the limited number of units may prevent statistically significant conclusive evidence.  
4.1 Defining East Africa 
Due to the aforementioned distinct rainfall patterns of this region, East Africa provides 
a good “laboratory” to study the potential effects of excessive rainfall on conflict. 
Therefore, East Africa will be studied separately, in addition to being included in the 
main dataset.   
The eastern parts of Africa go under many names, and there are various ways in which 
these definitions are being used. In some contexts, the region East Africa may consist 
of only a few countries. The East African Community (EAC) for instance, consists of 
five eastern African countries, and is commonly referred to when defining east Africa 
as a region (EAC 2010).  The definition used by the UN on the other hand, is much 
more extensive, and includes no less than 19 countries (UN stat 2010). In addition, it 
seems that many of the studies on the topics of climate change, security and conflict 
use a variety of different definitions. I chose to follow a definition used by Schreck 
and Semazzi (2004). What they term eastern Africa, or Greater horn of Africa, consists 
of Burundi, Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, Rwanda, Somalia, Sudan, Uganda, and 
Tanzania (Schreck and Semazzi 2004: 681).  
The reason I rely on this definition is my very reason for focusing on East Africa rests 
on the distinct nature of climate patterns that the study of Schreck and Semazzi (2004) 
has identified in just this region. Because of a large amount of missing values on key 
variables, Eritrea is left out of the analysis, and I am hence left with 9 east African 
countries.   
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4.2 Unit of analysis 
The unit of analysis to be investigated here is country years; one particular country in 
one particular year. Although this is commonly used (Buhaug and Theisen 2010; 
Burke et al. 2009; Hauge and Ellingsen 1998; Miguel et al. 2004), it is not the only 
way to go about. Despite of its apparent popularity, the approach has its limitations. 
Both the geographical aspect and the time aspect could be more refined. Variations 
within a country can be great, both when it comes to weather events, social 
composition and conflict. Varied landscape creates different types of climates; 
Tanzania for instance has a large range of different climates due to the varied 
landscape encompassing everything from high mountains, long desert – like stretches 
of land, and endless savannahs to tropical forests, large lakes and a humid coastline. 
Resource availability may similarly vary significantly within the boarders of one state 
(Buhaug and Theisen 2010: 17), as a result of both structural and natural factors. In 
addition, partly due to the previously mentioned artificial nature of African boarders, 
demographic variations, also within the borders of a state, are large. Unlike in many 
other states, African borders do not follow ethnical and national identities, nor do 
identities necessarily follow the borders. This means that many African states are 
made up of several sub groups and societies that may have more in common with 
similar subgroups in neighbouring states than with their respective nationals.  Climatic 
factors in one part of the country does not necessarily have anything to do with 
intergroup violence occurring in an other part of the country, and having country year 
as a unit of analysis does not capture these nuances.  As seen, some studies have had a 
spatial disaggregation (Raleigh and Urdal 2007, Theisen et al. 2010) that may better 
capture some of these aspects. Yet while this spatial aggregation is more sensitive to 
geographical and demographical features like those just mentioned, there are reasons 
why state borders is a natural delimitation.   
Hendrix and Salehyan (2010) argue that there is little reason to expect that the effects 
of local environmental conditions will be limited to the immediate area only. Acute 
resource shortage and failed agriculture in rural areas, for instance, will also be noticed 
on food prices in urban areas within the same state. So called eco migration is also 
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much more likely to happen within the boarders of a state, and it is possible to imagine 
that many of those forced to leave their homes and villages may move into the urban 
centres. In this sense, more fine-tuned composition of grid-cell of a certain size, does 
not capture these political and economical conditions that are characteristic of a state. 
A political unit, however “artificially made” it is, and however elite driven, weak or 
centralized the power of this unit, still seems a logical choice for analysis.  
Another valid approach, used by many scholars, would have been to use conflict years, 
hence have the years with conflict as the main observation rather than countries. The 
reason why this has not be chosen is that country years gives a better opportunity of 
comparing conflict events to non conflict events. While it is not rarely used, for the 
purposes of this thesis, it would entail an unfortunate selecting on the dependent 
variable. Furthermore, as I will be studying conflict onset in addition to intensity, 
using conflict years as unit of analysis would be difficult.  
The decision to use country years provide me with 889 observations in the main 
dataset, and a total of 186 observations for the selection of east African countries.  
4.3 Statistical methods 
Two different regression methods will be used here due to the different characteristics 
of the dependent variables. Conflict onset is a dichotomous variable with the values 0 
for no conflict onset, and 1 for conflict onset. Therefore, logistic regression is the best 
choice to analyse this model. Besides the difference in method however, the same 
variables will be applied in the analyses for both onset and intensity, again to maintain 
a basis for comparison.  
The logistic regression model is based on a binary dependent variable. There are two 
versions of logistic regression outcome; log odds and odds ratio. Odds ratio, the odds 
for one group divided by the odds for another group,  measures the relative change in 
the odds of having the value 1 in the dependent variable when there is a one unit 
increase in an explanatory variable, controlled for all other variables (Skog 2007: 364-
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365).  When odds ratio is 1, this describes a situation where the odds for both groups is 
equal.  Log odds are the natural logarithm of odds, and are a bit more difficult to 
interpret. Where odds ratio have the value 1 indicating that two outcomes are equally 
probable, log odds have the value 0 (Hegre 2008). Log odds hence have both positive 
and negative values, where odds ratio only have positive  ones (OR<1 indicates a 
negative correlation).  The outcomes in tell how much the log odds change for a one 
unit increase in the independent variable. 
The logistic regression equation can in its simplest form be written as  
𝑌� =  11 + 𝑒−(𝑏0 + 𝑏1 ∙ 𝑥)𝑒 
 
In order to analyse the second dependent variable, intensity, ordered ranged logistic 
regression is applied. This is because, as I will return to, conflict intensity will be 
measured as a categorical variable.  Ordered logistic regression is based the same logic 
as regular logistic regression, with the difference being that the “ologit” is designed for 
ordinal outcomes with more than two categories (Hamilton 2009: 279). It could in 
theory have been possible to use a linear model, but this would require a higher 
amount of categories in able to fulfil the requirements of a linear model.  The 
advantage the ordered logistic model has over a linear one is that when the distances 
between the thresholds are unequal, a linear model where the ordinal variables are 
treated as interval can give misleading results, while the same is not true for the 
ordered logistic one (Armstrong and Jackson 2009).   
In the latter approach, the coefficients tells us something about the increase in odds of 
being in a higher group on the dependent variable, for a one unit increase in the 
independent one – holding other factors constant.  
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4.4 Operationalization of variables 
To be able to  move from the theoretical discussion of phenomena to studying these 
empirically, it is crucial to define these phenomena in a way that can be measured 
(Hellevik 2002: 50 – 51). This is what is called the operationalization of the variables, 
and is an important part of the statistical analysis. Operationalizing refers to the 
process of making the theoretical concepts quantifiable; more specifically it means to 
make the concepts measurable through the development of indicators (Adcock & 
Collier 2001: 530-531). These indicators should be created in a careful manner to 
ensure that they do in fact measure the theoretical concepts they are meant to measure. 
This is denoted by the validity of a study, to which I will return  in a later section.  
4.4.1 The dependent variables 
Most studies on the environment – conflict connection focus on civil war and internal 
conflict. Only few, like Gartzke (2010), examine the link between climate change and 
interstate war.  This study comes short in finding any support for the hypothesis that 
climate change causes or in any other way affects when and if nations fight. Gartzke 
argues that if we are to say that global warming makes the world more violent, this 
must be a statement that applies generally and not just in special cases. Yet if the 
criterion to make such a statement is that it is applicable to interstate conflicts in 
general, it would be almost impossible to draw the conclusion that climate change 
makes the world less stable and more violent. Lack of interstate war does not 
automatically leave a peaceful world. Conflicts may also cross boarders without being 
classified as interstate; it is a well known fact that unease tends to spread. Furthermore, 
it should be recalled that state security is not only concerned with external threats, but 
also internal ones; meaning that interstate war is not the only choice when we want to 
make inferences about state security as well as individual security. Africa has since the 
end of colonization had remarkably few intestate wars (Henderson 2008:31), yet the 
continent has by no means been free of violence. Africa was a target of proxy wars 
during the cold war, and in the 1990s the continent saw several gruesome civil wars, 
like those in Rwanda, Sierra Leone and Liberia. In fact, in the 1980s and 1990s, 29 of 
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the 43 countries in sub-Saharan Africa experienced civil conflict (Miguel et al. 2004: 
726). Conflict here is hence defined in terms of internal conflict.   
There are two dependent variables to be included in the statistical analyses. In the first 
analysis, the dependent variable is conflict onset.  According to Ross (2004: 347) 
recent studies of conflict have relied on four datasets: Collier and Hoeffler (2002), 
Fearon and Laitin (2003), Elbadawi and Sambanis (2002), and Gleditsch et al. (2002), 
also known as the PRIO/Uppsala dataset. There are thus several different available 
sources of a conflict measure, and it is the definitions of these that are essential to my 
decision. Unlike the traditional definition of civil war used in several studies, with a 
conflict being defined by a minimum threshold of 1000 deaths, the data I will rely on 
here, Gleditsch et al. (2002),  has a threshold of 25 battle related deaths. The 
theoretical arguments driving the search for a potential link between climate change 
and conflict are not applicable mainly to major civil wars. On the contrary, many of 
the assumptions regarding this link assume conflict in this context to be of relatively 
low intensity (Hendrix and Salehyan 2010; Meier et al. 2007).  
The PRIO/Uppsala definition of conflict is as follows: 
“... a contested incompatibility that concerns government and/or territory where 
the use of armed force between two parties, of which at least one is the 
government of a state, results in at least 25 battle-related deaths” (Gleditsch et 
al. 2002).  
This implies that all conflicts that do not include involvement from the government of 
a country are excluded from this analysis. There are good theoretical reasons to 
include so called non-conventional conflict as well to draw inferences on the effects of 
climate change on conflict and security, especially because the threshold for violence 
may be lower when the government is not directly involved, and these forms of 
smaller scale conflict do not need government involvement (Hendrix and Salehyan 
2010). Several of the studies I have mentioned here use civil war as a dependent 
variable. Others use violent conflict, and yet others argue that nonviolent conflict is 
more likely to be affected by climate change related factors. Hendrix and Salehyan 
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(2010) look at other forms of disorder than violent conflict, and argue that these are the 
forms of conflict that are most likely to be affected by rainfall variability since they do 
not require mass mobilization or resources. Yet their findings do in fact find the 
strongest correlation on violent events, indicating that even if at a lower level, rainfall 
variability might spark violence. Lower levels of conflict may also serve as a first step 
to violent conflict (Brown et al. 2007). While both types of conflict are interesting in 
this regard, for the interest of this thesis which aims to study conflict as an expression 
of (in)security in the more traditional meaning of the word, studying violent conflict is 
more fruitful. This is additionally based on the fact that my arguments to a large 
degree are based upon what other studies have done – and the majority of these studies 
look at a form of violent conflict. Furthermore, for violent conflict including a certain 
number of casualties, I argue that some sort of government involvement is likely in the 
majority of the cases. 
Another characteristic about the abovementioned definition of conflict worth 
mentioning is that a conflict with 25 deaths in the period November – February may 
not be registered as a conflict, while the same amount of battle related deaths from 
January – December will. This is however not expected to have any large implications 
for this study, since this is the same for previous studies relying on the same definition.  
The conflict onset variable is taken as found in Buhaug (2010)’s replication data. Since 
several of the replication datasets I have used contained a conflict variable based on 
the same criteria and derived from the same source, the Gleditsch et al. dataset, the 
decision on which one to use was based on amount of missing values. The differences 
between the measures were not that great however, and a correlation of the various 
measures revealed that besides the missing values, the variables were, as is to be 
expected, pretty much identical.  
Conflict intensity is here being operationalized as number of deaths, although other 
aspects too could be included to measure intensity. I do however hold number of 
deaths to be an appropriate measure of conflict intensity, especially since the focus 
here is on violent conflicts, and the conflict onset variable is based on the same 
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measure.  As violence increases it is likely that the number of injured increases with a 
simultaneous and proportional rise in number of deaths. Hence I expect the injury – 
casualty ratio to stay more or less the same as the conflict grows or intensifies. Since 
conflict is defined and operationalized as armed conflict including a certain amount of 
casualties, it is natural that conflict intensity is defined as a increasing/decreasing 
function of this.  
Ideally, this would have been measured as a linear variable with absolute numbers of 
casualties, much like how severity was measured in Hauge and Ellingsen´s study 
(1998). However, as this proved difficult given both a lack of data availability and 
certain aspects of my design, the intensity variable is constructed based on a division 
into three categories; value 0 refers to situations of “no conflict”, or low intensity, as 
this is defined by Gleditsch et al. (2002), meaning from 0 to 24 deaths. Category one is 
that of medium intensity, including those cases where a conflict has between 25 and 
999 casualties in a year. Finally, category two consists of those conflicts that in 
literature are often referred to as civil wars, conflicts with 1000 or more casualties.  
A characteristic of this new variable worth mentioning is that category two is made 
from the onset variable of Buhaug (2010), and category three is from the civil war 
variable of Burke et al. (2009). While Buhaug have specified that “his” variable 
follows the so called two year rule, indicating that a conflict must have been dead for 
minimum two years to be coded as onset, no such specification is made in the variable 
derived from the Burke et al. data. Because the new  variable is meant to measure 
intensity and not onset, this is not likely to cause any significant problems, but is 
important to be aware of. 
4.4.2 The independent variables 
The main explanatory factor of interest in this study is rainfall variability. Because I 
seek to look at intra annual variations in rainfall, I face some difficulties in the design. 
Due to my arguments regarding the characteristics of rainfall and that both amount and 
timing should be accounted for - the aim was to have an independent variable that 
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captures both intra annual trends as well as variations in rain, in a good way. My 
preferred strategy would be to look at monthly change – and use months as units rather 
than years. A similar approach was implemented by Meier et al. (2007),in a study of 
environmental variability and pastoral conflict in east Africa. Based on my main 
arguments, this seemed a logical choice for the purposes of this thesis too.  Despite my 
repeated attempts to get a hold of such data, however, none were found, and the 
decision was made to go with the second best strategy, using yearly data.  
The independent variables are collected from two different sources.  To properly 
measure all aspects of rainfall variations, I include climatic anomalies, drought and 
flood in the analysis.  In a recent study, Buhaug (2010) introduced a rainfall variable 
that does much of what I have argued as important when studying the effects of rain. 
In his study, inter-annual growth, i.e. the proportional change since the previous year, 
and climate anomaly, i.e. proportional deviation from mean annual levels of 
precipitation, are both applied  (ibid: 4).  Measuring not only yearly change, but also 
deviation from annual mean,  these indicators capture the complexity of rainfall 
variability more satisfactory than those of several other studies that measure inter – 
annual growth only. In addition to the original variables, these measures are recoded 
into variables with 4 categories reaching from little change to extreme change. This 
operation has two advantages; first of all it makes it possible to study the effects of 
only the size of the deviation, in addition to the original variable measuring direction. 
Secondly, it facilitates the interpretation of interaction terms. After trying to divide the 
categories in percentiles of  25 % and finding that such an approach gave a distribution 
too skewed to make sense, the lowest category now reaches from 0 to 15 percent, and 
the highest from 70 percent and up. While the distribution of observations in each 
category is still unequal, it provides a good middle way between the need to have 
equal categories and the need to have categories reflecting a theoretically defendable 
image of reality.  
As a supplement to the rainfall indicators, being expressions of what Hendrix and 
Salehyan termed hydro-meteorological disasters (2010), measures of flood and 
drought are also included as explanatory variables. This data is collected from the 
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Emergency Events Database EM-DAT, developed by Centre for Research on the 
Epidemiology of Disasters (CRED), and give the total number of each one of these 
natural disasters for each country and year. For a disaster to qualify for inclusion in 
this database, at least one of four criteria’s must be met: a minimum of 10 people 
reported dead, at least 100 people reported affected, a declaration of a state of 
emergency, or a call for international assistance (CRED 2010). What could be 
problematic in this regard, is that whether or not a disaster is reported is very much 
dependent on political will. The criteria are based on voluntary reporting disasters, and 
involving the international community, which may create a bias of underreported 
natural disasters some places, especially in countries with oppressing regime types. 
While it is important to beware of this, I do not see this as a big enough problem to 
exclude the measures from the analysis, especially since a look at the data reveals the 
distribution of reported events is fairly even. It may also be useful to keep in mind that 
value 0 does not necessarily mean that no disaster took place, it simply means that no 
disaster was reported. 
A benefit of using flood and drought, is that they measure both rapid and slow onset 
changes, respectively. This makes it possible to measure the expectation that these 
may have different effects on the dependent variable, as argued in chapter 3. I hence 
expect flood to have a more immediate effect on conflict than drought. Furthermore, 
these indicators measure different sides of the rainfall scale, with flood being 
theoretically closely tied to my argument regarding too much rain. The variables thus 
partially make up for the lack of an intra – annual measure in the precipitation 
variable, through clearly measuring episodes related to too much or too little rain.  
4.4.3 The control variables 
As mentioned previously, analysing the effects of climate change alone is not 
satisfactory to study the consequences of climate change. Other factors may in 
themselves be causally linked to the dependent variable, as well as to the independent 
variables.  These alternative explanations for the phenomenon being studied should be 
accounted for, and controlling for other factors eliminates competing explanations and 
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give more strength to the model (Skog 2004:107). The control variables are chosen 
based on what is traditionally understood and proven as being linked to conflict, in 
addition to being based on the notion of vulnerability. The same indicators hence serve 
as control through being additional explanation variables, in addition to being included 
in interaction with the main independent variables.  
4.4.3.1 Ethnicity 
Theoretically there are numerous ways in which ethnicity and ethnic cleavages can 
relate to conflict. Buhaug (2010) for instance, applies a measure of ethnic group`s 
access to power; ethno political exclusion. In this thesis however, ethnicity will not 
only be used as a control variable included to account for alternative explanations of 
conflict, but is also assumed to interplay with the main independent variable and 
determine the effect this has on conflict. The focus here is on ethnic diversity, based 
on the aforementioned argument that environmental stress might increase the risk of 
intergroup encounters. This argument depends on number of ethnical groups. A higher 
number of ethnical groups might also indicate that the number of different 
communities, run as subunits within the country is higher. In places where distances 
are large and infrastructure limited, interaction between communities is not always 
widespread. As environmental stress limits the availability of resources however, this 
might change. Ethnical diversity will hence be operationalized as ethnic 
fractionalization, indicating number of ethnical groups.  
Importantly, this variable may capture more than just ethnicity. Ethnicity in itself is 
often conceived as being a socially constructed component of our identity, and may as 
well relate to class and politics as to race and ethnic background (Fearon and Laitin 
2000: 858). Hence if found to be statistically significant, this should be taken into 
consideration when concluding the effect. Yet while it is uncertain to what degree a 
measure of ethnicity measure other socio economic factors, it is certain that it does in 
fact measure ethnicity.  
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The variable is collected from the quality of government dataset (Samanni et al. 2010), 
but originates in that of Alesina et al. (2003), and measures degree of fractionalization 
on a scale from 0 to 1. Following my arguments, it is expected that as this indicator 
moves towards higher values, the risk of conflict increase. Empirically, the link 
between ethnic fractionalization and conflict is not proven, with some studies finding 
little evidence of such a link (Miguel et al. 2004; Fearon and Laitin 2003)4
4.4.3.2 Vulnerability 
. 
Theoretically however, there are as argued well-founded reasons to expect ethnic 
diversity to have an impact on conflict, also in interaction with climate change.  
The theoretical concepts that will be controlled for here, based on the notion of 
vulnerability as discussed in chapter 3, leave a variety of choices when it comes to 
operationalization. Since vulnerability is not easily defined or quantified, the variables 
included are also partly based on what is traditionally seen as the most influential of 
conflict.  As already emphasised, vulnerability is made up of three interrelated 
components. The first one, exposure, is already being tested for through rainfall 
variability, and no further variables related to this will be included.  
When it comes to sensitivity and adaptive capacity, since the two are interrelated, 
several factors fit in both categories. First of all, level of development will dictate both 
the degree of sensitivity, understood as the degree to which a system is impacted by 
climatic change, and the ability of a society to adapt to this. It has been claimed that 
properly functioning economic institutions, and economic prosperity can provide 
incentives to encourage preservation and develop new sources of resources (Homer 
Dixon 1999: 25).  In this thesis, GDP per capita is being used as an indicator of level 
of development. Economic factors not only determine how well a society adapts to and 
avoid the most acute harms of climate change, but are also often mentioned as 
alternative reason for conflict. Poverty is believed to be one of the main contributors to 
conflict today, this way GDP measures both vulnerability and provides an alternative 
                                                 
4 Slettbak and DeSoysa (2010), however, find ethnic fractionalization to be significant and 
positively correlated with conflict.  
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explanation for conflict. The variable originates in the Buhaug (2010) dataset. It is log 
transformed to account for a right skewed distribution , and is also recoded into four 
equal categories and included in interaction terms with rainfall variability measures.  
Through the interaction term,  the variable capture some of the expectations of neo 
Malthusian deprivation hypothesis as well (Kahl 2006).   
Another crucial factor that is related both to vulnerability to climate change, level of 
development and conflict in general, is system of governance or state capacity. Again, 
this is assumed to be closely linked with both sensitivity and adaptive capacity, but 
perhaps especially the latter.  It might also have an impact on the independent 
variables in that both the flood and drought indicators are dependent on reporting, and 
thus political will and ability to do so. State capacity or regime type is operationalized 
through the indicator polity2, measuring democratization on a scale from -10 to +10. 
This variable stems from Marshall and Jaggers polity IV dataset (2009) , as is found in 
the Burke et al. (2009) replication dataset.   Political protest and violence is least 
common in highly repressive authoritarian regimes, more common in democracies, 
and most common in hybrid regimes (Hendrix and Salehyan 2010: 16). One 
explanation for this is that authoritarian regimes tend to be more repressive, and will 
through force prevent people from turning to violence, especially violence directed 
against the state, which is the type of conflicts that will be in focus here. It is 
furthermore believed that democracies will be better at providing other outlets and 
alternatives to violence, so that the closer we get to a perfect democracy, the less 
conflict. This is related to the neo Malthusian state failure hypothesis, claiming that 
environmental scarcity related deprivation will only turn in to violence where the state 
is to weak to prevent it (Kahl 2006:10). Hence I expect a curvilinear shape where the 
effect of climate change on conflict is larger the closer we get to the middle. The 
notion of a curvilinear relationship between polity and conflict is well backed by 
previous empirical studies as well, showing that the middle values are in fact more 
prone to conflict (Slettbak and deSoysa 2010).  Because I expect such a relationship, I 
introduce a polity squared variable, which  accounts for curvlinearity. Additionally, 
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this indicator too is included in interaction terms, both in its original form and as a 
recoded variable with 4 equal categories.  
Finally, for statistical control, population size is also included in the analysis5
All variables were correlated to ensure that the independence between them was 
satisfactory. The highest correlation was between ethnic fractionalization and log 
transformed GDP, with a value of about 0.4, and multi-collinearity does hence not 
represent a problem.  
. The 
battle death threshold of 25 is presumably easier met in Nigeria than in Djibouti given 
that Nigeria has roughly 150 to 200 times more people than Djibouti. Together with 
GDP, population size  is one of the most common control variables included in the 
civil war literature (Hegre and Sambanis 2006: 512). This variable too is log 
transformed, and is taken from the Buhaug (2010) dataset.  
4.5 Reliability and validity 
For all scientific research, there are certain methodological goals that should be aimed 
for in order to ensure the quality of the analysis. These are reliability and validity. 
Reliability refers to the way data is measured, and when achieved to satisfaction it 
entails the expectation that a study is replicable. This basically means that any other 
scholar with the desire to do so, should be able to follow your steps and easily 
replicate your study. In a statistical study, the reliability is closely connected to 
accuracy in the collecting of data (Hellevik 2002: 183).  
The data being used here, in addition to stemming from respectable sources, has all 
been published in the past. The only variables not extracted from a pre-existing 
dataset, flood and drought, were downloaded in excel and changed by hand before 
transferred to the statistical package Stata. The changes made were purely cosmetical, 
                                                 
5 Based on arguments about population pressure, and on the general concern that migration 
is liked to conflict, a measure of hosted refugees stemming from Gleditsch and Salehyan 
(2006) was also included in the analyses. Because this variable had a large amount of 
missing, however, and its inclusion did not change the general picture, the variable was 
omitted and is not demonstrated in the models in this thesis.    
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yet the data was thoroughly checked and double checked before included in the main 
dataset, to ensure that no unintended changes had occurred.  Other than that, few 
changes have been made to the data, and those that have been made are well accounted 
for. Hence the reliability of the data is considered to be high. This also goes for the 
reliability of the study as a whole, as every step is accounted for and documented in 
the do file.  
 High reliability is furthermore a necessary condition for high validity (Hellevik 2002: 
52). Validity has to do with data relevance and how well the theoretical concept is 
captured and defined in the operationalized indicator. Together with reliability, this 
definitional validity make up the validity of the data (ibid: 52; 183).  
 It is relatively safe to say that the first dependent variable, conflict onset, is a relevant 
measure of conflict onset, and fulfils the requirements of what is called face validity 
(ibid: 52). This can also be said for the independent variables. Measuring rainfall, 
flood and drought, they capture both the slow and rapid nature of rainfall, as well as 
rainfall relative to the normal. The issue of conflict intensity is a bit more problematic 
however. As mentioned, with only three categories, this is far from a perfect indicator 
of conflict intensity understood as number of battle related deaths. A measure in 
absolute numbers would have been preferred.  What is more, it can be argued that a 
conflict’s intensity is much more than casualties. Yet because this is the measure of 
intensity given in most of the conflict literature, and based on the aforementioned logic 
of violence and battle related deaths, I argue that battle related deaths is a valid 
measure of conflict intensity. While the categorical variable does measure intensity, it 
is however  a somewhat limited measure of this.  
The vulnerability measures may also say to fulfil the requirements of validity. While 
vulnerability entails a lot more than what is being measured here, it would be 
impossible to include them all, and the indicators included are in fact theoretically 
closely linked to vulnerability as defined in the literature (see Kinnas 2005).  
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5 Findings and analysis  
The hypotheses presented in this thesis presume that there is a positive relationship 
between rainfall extremes and conflict, that this relationship is stronger for conflict 
intensity than onset, and that the effects are stronger the higher the level of 
vulnerability. It is further expected that for especially  the first  hypothesis, the effects 
of positive rainfall extremes on conflict should be more noticeable in East Africa. In 
this chapter I present the results and findings of the regression analyses, and then 
explore whether and to what extent my hypotheses are supported by statistical 
evidence. Does this  analysis give a clearer picture of a potential link between rainfall 
variability and violent conflict? 
In the analyses of rainfall variability, both the original variables, and a set of recoded 
variables were tested6
To test the hypothesis that level of vulnerability will influence the strength of the 
effect rainfall variability might have on conflict, vulnerability variables are included 
both as normal control variables standing alone, and in interaction with the main 
precipitation variable.  
. The reasoning behind the recoding was originally embedded 
partially in the wish to simplify the making and interpretation of indexes and 
interaction terms, ensuring that the variables were on the same scale. These recoded 
variables then say nothing about whether the precipitation increases or decreases, just 
about how much it changes, which is in line with the arguments that an increase in 
rainfall should be accounted for at the same level as decrease. Flood and drought are 
included as indicators of hydro-meteorological disasters, measuring rapid and slow 
onset changes, respectively.  
                                                 
6 Naturally, not all run test will be presented in this section, however, the models presented 
are mainly representative of the general findings.  
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The main analysis covers 41 countries in sub Saharan Africa, in the years 1981 to 
2002.  For one observation in every country and year, this makes a total of 889 
observations.  
 This analysis differ from earlier studies in two main respects; first of all I include 
measures for flood and drought and  test these along with the precipitation measures 
both on Sub Saharan Africa,  and on a selection of east African countries. This is 
founded in the expectation that we might  see a slightly different pattern in East Africa 
with regards to, especially excessive, rainfall. And second, I run the same tests on 
conflict intensity, as on conflict onset, based on the argument that the nature of 
ongoing conflicts may be more affected than the initiation of new ones.  
5.1 Conflict onset – logistic regression analysis 
In the pursuit to find out weather the analyses can provide support for the hypotheses 
posed in this thesis, several models were tested. The models selected to be presented 
here  are representative of  the general pattern found throughout all the analyses 
performed. In the models termed “A”, the original variables have been used, while 
letter “B” indicates that the analysis has been performed with the recoded variables 
consisting of four categories. Furthermore, the first model, 1.0A, the main independent 
variable is precipitation change compared to previous year, while in the rest of the 
models the precipitation variable indicates deviation from long term trend. For reasons 
of simplicity and comparison, these patterns are followed for all the tables.   
The coefficients are reported in log odds.  
5.1.1 Sub Saharan Africa 
A quick look at table 1 reveals first of all that few of the variables turn out statistically 
significant.  
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Table 1: Results for conflict onset in Sub Saharan Africa 
 Model 1,0A Model 1,1A  Model 1,2A Model 1,2B Model 1,1B 
explanatory 
variables           
precipitation  -0.164 0.168   0.166 
 (0.582) (0.714)   (0.282) 
precipitation 1lag -0.216 -0.771 -0.729 -0.516 -0.543* 
 (0.636) (0.862) (0.871) (0.328) (0.328) 
precipitation 2lag 0.576** 1.531** 1.542** 0.464* 0.455* 
 (0.237) (0.727) (0.730) (0.273) (0.273) 
flood 0.115 0.113 0.121 0.118 0.117 
 (0.221) (0.222) (0.221) (0.213) (0.213) 
drought -0.205 -0.202 -0.206 -0.199 -0.211 
 (0.497) (0.497) (0.497) (0.498) (0.498) 
interaction       
interaction    0.003 0.031  
    (0.098) (0.113)  
other variables       
Log GDP -0.205 -0.178 -0.171 -0.090 -0.045 
 (0.284) (0.281) (0.280) (0.334) (0.271) 
Ethnic Fract. -0.048 0.092 0.104 0.060 0.060 
 (1.002) (0.983) (0.985) (0.226) (0.227) 
squared polity2 -0.024** -0.023** -0.023** -0.783** -0.785** 
 (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.249) (0.249) 
log population -0.030 -0.073 -0.076 -0.082 -0.074 
 (0.155) (0.149) (0.149) (0.152) (0.152) 
Constant -0.444 -0.322 -0.361 -0.900 -1.156 
 (2.669) (2.681) (2.673) (1.990) (2.038) 
statistical 
measures       
Observations 832 832 832 832 832 
Log likelihood -160,557 -161,954 -161,979 -162,816 -162,683 
Pseudo R2 0.0674 0.0593 0.0591 0.0543 0.0550 
       
Standard errors in parentheses     
** p<0.05, * p<0.1      
Letter A indicating model with original variables, B indicating model with recoded 
variables  
Model 1.0 is run with precipitation change as dependent variable, the rest with precipitation deviation  
 
Of the explanatory variables, precipitation only turn out significant when lagged two 
years, with positive values in all the models. The effect is weaker for change, shown in 
the first model,  than for deviation, but the effects seem fairly robust and give the same 
significant values in all models. This is also the case for several  of the models not 
51 
 
demonstrated here, including when only the explanatory variables are included in the 
model. For the original precipitation variable this substantially means that a growth in 
rainfall is associated with conflict two years down the line, while for the recoded ones 
in models B, it means that deviations, both positive and negative, are positively 
correlated with conflict two years after. For the original variables, the values stay 
consistently at 1.5, while the recoded measure has a value of 0.45. Furthermore,  in the 
last model, precipitation lagged one year also turns out significant, but with negative 
values. This pattern is consistent, although mostly not statistically significant, 
throughout the models. The two measures of hydro meteorological disasters also point 
in opposite directions, with flood always giving positive values, and drought  giving 
negative ones. None of these measures turned out significant in any of the models 
however, but do nevertheless stay remarkably consistent.  
The only interaction term presented in the table is that including precipitation and 
GDP, both for the original and for the recoded variables. Precipitation was omitted in 
these tables, because the multiplicative terms are meant to capture the effect 
precipitation has in interaction with vulnerability variables7. However, comparing this 
to the models without such interaction terms, it is clear that the inclusion of these 
terms has very little effect8
A bit surprisingly perhaps, the only statistically significant control variable is squared 
polity. This measure stays significant at a p<0.05 level throughout the analysis, with 
small negative values of 0.023 for the original variables, and 0.78 for the recoded ones 
indicating that a shift towards democracy slightly decreases the risk of conflict onset. 
.  This was also the case for the interaction terms 
constructed of precipitation, and ethnic fractionalization and polity respectively.  
Since the control variables in this analysis are commonly used by the general 
literature, being theoretically closely linked to conflict,  it is also surprising that 
                                                 
7 When the original precipitation variable is included in a model with interaction, the values 
for both precipitation and the interaction term become extremely high, as do the standard 
errors.  
8 To account for the fact that GDP and precipitation are theoretically assumed to have 
opposite effects on conflict risk, interaction terms were also included where GDP was 
reversed. This made no difference.  
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pseudo R29
 To get a closer look at a potential correlation between the independent variables and 
conflict onset, regression analyses were also performed testing only the cases where 
precipitation values are positive, indicating an increase in rainfall compared to the 
average. The same was done for only negative values, and for the cases where the 
recoded deviation measure had values of  2 or more, indicating large deviations from 
average rainfall.  The general patterns turned out quite similar to that in table 1. 
Additionally, both flood and drought were lagged to test for potential delayed effects  
of these on conflict. Theoretically, especially in the case of slow onset disaster 
drought,  this should give some results. None of these indicators however, showed any 
sign of being significant when lagged, although drought did perform slightly better 
when lagged one year, corresponding with the expectations that slow onset changes 
may also take more time in influencing conflict.  
 values are so low. Although this measure should be interpreted with 
caution, it is evident that the values of this measure are in fact very low. These values 
roughly indicate that only 5-6 per cent of the variance is being explained by the 
independent variables in these models. 
To see if these general findings changes where precipitation patterns are different, 9 
east African countries were isolated and studied apart10
5.1.2 East Africa 
.  
As mentioned, to avoid complicating the potential for comparing the models in the 
different tables, the same models are demonstrated and presented for the selection of 
east African countries as for the main data.  
 
                                                 
9 The Pseudo R2 measure reported here is that of McFadden. Substantially it has less 
meaning than the r squared measures in linear regression, yet it nevertheless says 
something about how much of the variance in the dependent variable is explained by the 
variables in the model.  
10 The same data including all countries expect for the east African ones was also studied. 
The main findings using this approach was very similar to those demonstrated in table 1. 
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Table 2: Results for conflict onset in East Africa 
 Model 2,0A Model 2,1A Model 2,2A Model 2,2B Model 2,1B 
explanatory 
variables           
precipitation  -0.182 0.105   -0.505 
 (1.199) (1.059)   (0.580) 
precipitation 1lag 0.368 -0.299       -0.202 -0.201 -0.273 
 (0.482) (1.133) (1.161) (0.533) (0.543) 
precipitation 2lag 0.930** 1.365 1.363 1.130** 1.152** 
 (0.453) (0.982) (0.986) (0.512) (0.504) 
flood 0.388 0.443* 0.455* 0.343 0.344 
 (0.279) (0.269) (0.269) (0.277) (0.273) 
drought -0.006 0.009 0.001 -0.062 -0.081 
 (0.743) (0.739) (0.741) (0.795) (0.787) 
interaction       
interaction GDP    -0.020 -0.303  
    (0.151) (0.227)  
other variables       
Log GDP -0.012 0.253 0.272 2.513 1.439 
 (1.026) (0.990) (0.997) (1.747) (1.307) 
Ethnic fract. -2.159 -1.294 -1.261 -0.567 -0.522 
 (1.758) (1.514) (1.505) (0.449) (0.438) 
squared Polity2 -0.013 -0.009 -0.009 -0.405 -0.310 
 (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.528) (0.513) 
log population 0.450 0.138 0.126 0.442 0.391 
 (0.472) (0.388) (0.384) (0.405) (0.396) 
Constant -5.359 -4.767 -4.801 -10.308* -8.012 
 (9.321) (9.178) (9.215) (6.141) (5.633) 
Statistical 
measures       
Observations 186 186 186 186 186 
Log likelihood -53,146 -45,869 -45,865 -43,239 -43,793 
Pseudo R2 0.1314 0.0766 0.0767 0.1295 0.1184 
       
Standard errors in parentheses     
** p<0.05, * p<0.1      
Letter A indicating model with original variables, B indicating model with recoded variables 
Model 2.0 is run with precipitation change as dependent variable, the rest with precipitation deviation 
 
In general, there is not much change from the main data. When lagged two years, 
precipitation give a bit higher values in the models with recoded variables, and stay 
significant in these. In the models with original variables however, it loses 
significance. What is perhaps interesting, is that in these models flood turn out 
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significant at a  p<0.1 level, with values being slightly higher than when studying sub 
Saharan Africa. These values stay consistent throughout the performed tests, being 
statistically significant in the majority of the models for east Africa, both when 
standing alone and when all other variables are included. When it tends to lose 
significance however, is when the recoded variables are included and the hydro -
meteorological measures are not lagged.  
In these tests, none of the control variables, nor the interaction terms turn out 
significant. The overall explained variance is slightly higher than those in table 1.  
Conflict onset summary11
The main pattern when studying precipitation variability and conflict onset then, is that 
of few statistically significant outcomes, relatively consistent patterns, and low 
explained variance.   
 
While the latter is based on a measure that is difficult to interpret, the Pseudo R2 also 
indicates that precipitation performs slightly better when measuring change from 
previous year than when measuring deviation for average means, as seen in the 
difference between the otherwise equal models for precipitation change and 
precipitation deviation. This is contrary to the expected outcome. Since these 
differences are relatively small, and are furthermore not consistent throughout the 
models, the focus remains on precipitation deviation as this is closer to my theoretical 
arguments.  
5.2 Conflict intensity 
To explore the relationship between rainfall variability and categorical dependent 
variable conflict intensity, ordered logistic regression analysis was used. The 
                                                 
11 In addition to conflict onset, some tests were also performed using conflict incidence as 
the dependent variable, holding conflict onset at 0. This revealed a slightly different pattern; 
with positive and significant values for drought and population size and negative significant 
values for both GDP and polity. None of the precipitation measures were significant using 
this approach.  
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interpretation of the coefficients in the ordered logistic model is based on the same 
logic as in regular logistic regression. The coefficients express the log odds of being in 
a higher conflict group for a one unit increase in the independent variable, all other 
factors held constant (Hegre 2008). Furthermore, statistical package Stata reports two 
constants. These represent the cut points between the three categories; the first 
constant denotes the log odds of being in a group higher than the lowest group vis a vis 
in the lowest group, all other factors held constant, and the second denotes the log 
odds of being in a higher than the second group vis a vis equal to or smaller than the 
second group, all other factors held constant.   
5.2.1 Sub Saharan Africa 
As with the analyses for conflict onset, all models were first tested on Sub Saharan 
Africa as a whole.  
From the table demonstrating the results for the ordered logistic regression analysis of 
the categorical intensity variable, it immediately becomes clear that the explanatory 
variables do not perform better here than in the logistic analyses. Only in one of the 
models do any of the explanatory variables turn out statistically significant; when 
lagged two years, precipitation change is positive and significant at the 0.05 level. Yet 
the patterns in regards to direction of the coefficients  is very much the same as that in 
tables 1 and 2. Of the control variables, in addition to polity, log population is positive 
and significant in all models. Substantially, this means that higher population size 
increases the risk of being in a higher conflict group. As these groups measure total 
amounts of battle deaths, it is not surprising that higher total population is associated 
with higher total number of battle deaths.  
What also changes from the analyses of onset is that when drought is lagged, both one 
and two years, it turns out positive and significant at the 0.05 level. Furthermore, as 
can be seen in table 3, when using intensity as the dependent variable, flood and 
drought follow a pattern quite opposite of that seen in the first two tables.  
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Unlike in the logistic regression analyses for conflict onset, the constants appear 
significant in some of the analyses of conflict intensity.  What they demonstrate, in 
models 3.2B and 3.1B, is that the log odds of being in a higher conflict group, all other 
factors held constant, is the same for both cut points. 
 
Table 3: results for conflict intensity in Sub Saharan Africa 
  
 Model 3.0A Model 3,1A Model 3,2A Model 3,2B Model 3,1B 
explanatory 
variables           
precipitation -0.182 -0.006   0.167 
  (0.475) (0.633)   (0.192) 
precipitation lag1 -0.187 -0.346 -0.340 -0.066 -0.087 
  (0.471) (0.638) (0.641) (0.201) (0.201) 
precipitation lag2 0.404** 0.912 0.914 0.234 0.224 
  (0.170) (0.563) (0.564) (0.193) (0.193) 
flood -0.181 -0.185 -0.184 -0.194 -0.196 
  (0.154) (0.155) (0.154) (0.151) (0.151) 
drought 0.285 0.281 0.280 0.320 0.312 
  (0.278) (0.278) (0.279) (0.278) (0.278) 
Interaction      
interaction   -0.003 0.032  
    (0.086) (0.083)  
Other variables      
log GDP -0.318* -0.294 -0.294 -0.327 -0.281 
  (0.183) (0.181) (0.181) (0.227) (0.185) 
ethnic fract -0.323 -0.213 -0.213 -0.016 -0.016 
  (0.664) (0.655) (0.655) (0.152) (0.153) 
squared polity2 -0.009** -0.009** -0.009** -0.363** -0.363** 
  (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.135) (0.135) 
log population 0.407** 0.376** 0.376** 0.387** 0.395** 
  (0.104) (0.101) (0.101) (0.102) (0.103) 
       
cut 1, constant 2.712 2.639 2.640 4.189** 4.458** 
  (1.726) (1.729) (1.727) (1.281) (1.324) 
cut 2, constant 3.163* 3.088* 3.089* 4.639** 4.909** 
  (1.727) (1.730) (1.729) (1.283) (1.326) 
statistical control      
Observations 825 825 825 825 825 
Log Likelihood -388,434 -389,93 -389,929 -288,393 -388,1 
PseudoR2 0.0471 0.0434 0.0434 0.0472 0.0479 
Standard errors in parentheses     
** p<0.05, * p<0.1      
Letter A indicating model with original variables, B indicating model with recoded variables                             
Model 3.0 is run with precipitation change as dependent variable, the rest with precipitation deviation 
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Also, the Pseudo R2 measure is in general slightly lower than in the first two tables, 
informing that the independent variables used in the statistical analyses do not seem to 
explain more of the variance in conflict intensity than conflict onset, as I assumed in 
the second hypothesis.  
 
5.2.2 East Africa 
Finally, the same analyses of conflict intensity was performed on the east African 
countries.  
In these models, the only statistically significant variable is log population. Since the 
number of observations is as small as it is, it is perhaps not to be expected that a 
categorical dependent variable would give significant results.  
In regards to the general patterns compared to conflict onset for east Africa, two small 
changes appears; both flood and polity have changed sign. None of the two however 
are statistically significant, and the log odds value for polity of 0.006 is dangerously 
close to zero.  
Compared to the main table for conflict intensity, the pattern is very similar here as 
well. Drought is the only variable pointing in the opposite direction from what it did in 
the main table, which is consistent with what was seen in the tables for conflict onset. 
Unlike what was found when comparing the two onset tables, however, the overall 
explained variance for conflict intensity is more or less the same regardless of whether 
it is the  main data or the dataset for East Africa that is being analysed.  
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Table 4: Results for conflict intensity in East Africa 
 Model 4,0A Model 4,1A Model 4,2A Model 4,2B Model 4,1B 
explanatory 
variables           
precipitation -1.027 -0.972   -0.276 
 (0.783) (0.913)   (0.336) 
precipitation lag1 -0.135 0.284 0.286 -0.252 -0.281 
 (0.397) (0.735) (0.742) (0.315) (0.316) 
precipitation lag2 0.256 0.351 0.362 0.259 0.282 
 (0.200) (0.662) (0.667) (0.310) (0.308) 
flood -0.059 -0.051 -0.057 -0.119 -0.130 
 (0.191) (0.190) (0.190) (0.191) (0.191) 
drought -0.306 -0.244 -0.246 -0.185 -0.203 
 (0.445) (0.447) (0.447) (0.449) (0.447) 
Interaction       
interaction    -0.123 -0.170  
    (0.124) (0.149)  
Other variables       
log GDP -0.156 -0.128 -0.120 0.894 0.497 
 (0.552) (0.547) (0.547) (0.989) (0.858) 
ethnic fract. -0.250 -0.157 -0.168 -0.141 -0.145 
 (0.881) (0.846) (0.846) (0.238) (0.237) 
squared polity2 0.006 0.006 0.006 0.221 0.236 
 (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.335) (0.332) 
log population 0.419* 0.373* 0.377* 0.458* 0.471** 
 (0.241) (0.222) (0.222) (0.243) (0.240) 
       
cut 1, constant 3.699 3.539 3.612 6.382* 5.803* 
 (5.150) (5.132) (5.130) (3.594) (3.514) 
cut 2, constant 4.098 3.935 4.007 6.783* 6.203* 
 (5.153) (5.135) (5.132) (3.599) (3.519) 
statistical control       
Observations 185 185 185 185 185 
Log likelihood -132,941 -134,387 -134,451 -133,056 -133,397 
PseudoR2 0.0445 0.0341 0.0336 0.0436 0.0412 
Standard errors in parentheses     
** p<0.05, * p<0.1      
Letter A indicating model with original variables, B indicating model with recoded variables  
Model 4.0 is run with precipitation change as dependent variable, the rest with precipitation deviation 
 
Intensity summary 
The two tables demonstrating the relationship between rainfall variability and conflict 
intensity, do not reveal any significant links between these two variables. The only 
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explanatory variable to turn out statistically significant in the analysis of conflict onset, 
has now lost its significance. Additionally, the measures for hydro meteorological 
disasters have changed sign in table 3, now indicating that flood is negatively 
correlated with conflict while drought is positively correlated.  
5.3 Analysis summary  
The statistical analyses in this thesis have been performed with basis in thee 
theoretically founded hypotheses regarding the relationship between rainfall variability 
and violent conflict. The first hypothesis was mainly motivated by the expectation that 
both negative and positive rainfall variations should be accounted for;   
H1: extreme variations in rainfall are positively correlated with conflict.  
This would entail that the precipitation indicators give positive and robust values. It 
remains clear from the models presented here that they do not. When lagged two years, 
the indicators for both change from previous year and deviation from average amounts 
do stay positive and significant throughout the models for conflict onset, but this 
pattern remains a bit difficult to explain due to the fact that the opposite pattern is 
found when the variable is lagged one year. There was no large difference between the 
coefficients in the models for only negative precipitation values and the ones for only 
positive values. Hence this analysis can not support the hypothesis that heavy rainfall 
or decreased rainfall have any influence on conflict onset, nor on conflict incidence. 
To account for what has been referred to as hydro meteorological disasters (Hendrix 
and Salehyan 2010), measuring both slow and rapid onset changes related to rainfall, 
indicators for flood and drought were included in the models. This partially accounts 
for the fact that intra annual rainfall variability was not as well covered by the data as I 
had initially hoped. While it is interesting that these measures point in opposite 
directions, they nevertheless do not turn out consistently significant, and hence do not 
lend much support to the first hypothesis either. The fact that flood shows signs of 
having an influence on conflict in east Africa, and that precipitation lagged two years 
is positive and significant in all the logistic regression analyses, is not enough to 
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conclude with support for the hypotheses that rainfall variability is particularly 
influential on conflict. Furthermore, the fact that none of these indicators were 
significant in the ordered logistic analyses either, clearly strengthens this conclusion.  
The second hypothesis;  
H2: Rainfall variability has more impact on conflict intensity than on conflict 
onset, 
was tested through applying a categorical conflict variable with three categories. It was 
expected that this would reveal a higher correlation between the explanatory variables 
and the dependent variable than when using conflict onset, but no such pattern was 
found. If anything, it may even seem that the contrary of my hypothesis is true, the 
rainfall variables seem to matter even less in these models; not only do they lack 
significance but the measures for explained variance are also slightly lower than in the 
conflict onset models. When lagged, drought seems to have a certain impact on 
conflict intensity, but this is not robust enough to support the hypothesis.  
Finally, the last hypothesis explored in this thesis was  
H3: the strength of the effect of rainfall variability on conflict depends on level of 
vulnerability. 
This was based on the expectation that the effects of the precipitation variables would 
be dependent on the values of especially three factors included to measure different 
non-environmental sides of vulnerability. This was sought measured through 
interaction terms including rainfall deviation coupled with GDP per capita, ethnic 
fractionalization and polity. As with the first two hypotheses, there was no support for 
this in the performed analyses. When included, the interaction terms did not turn out 
significant. Furthermore, when not included in interaction terms, these measures did 
not perform in a way consistent with the expectations.  This is especially true for GDP, 
that did not turn out significant at all, and did not act consistently throughout the 
models.  Here, only polity seemed to have an effect on conflict onset, and this effect 
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was generally weak, indicating a slight decrease in conflict risk with a one-unit 
increase in the polity score.  
Summarizing then, the main findings of this thesis are very much in line with that of 
the general literature in this field of study (see Theisen 2006; Keavane and Grey 2008; 
Bernauer et al. 2010;  Buhaug 2010 ). No convincing evidence of a correlation 
between rainfall variability and conflict was found, and the few tendencies in the data 
that could be interesting to investigate further are far too weak and unstable to provide 
any sort of support for the three hypotheses posed. The results from the statistical 
analyses, then, support the findings of the general literature: there is little evidence of a 
clear link between rainfall variability and violent conflict in Sub Saharan Africa.  
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6 Conclusion  
This thesis has investigated the relationship between climate change, operationalized 
as rainfall variability, and violent conflict in Sub Saharan Africa. The regression 
analyses performed in order to study this relationship was motivated by theoretical 
assumptions regarding the nature of rainfall variability and the nature of conflict, 
leading to three hypotheses. The first of these states that both positive and negative 
aberrations in precipitation should be accounted for when the aforementioned 
relationship is being studied, the second that the effects be stronger for conflict 
intensity than conflict onset, and the third hypothesis that the effects of rainfall 
variability be stronger in interaction with measures of vulnerability.  
All in all, the findings from the statistical analysis have not been able to confirm the 
hypotheses that motivated them.  
There are mainly two possible explanations for this lack of support. The first is that the 
findings reflect reality, and that there simply is no clear connection between 
precipitation patterns and conflict.  
This is supported by the fact that my findings are consistent with those of similar 
studies. In much of the empirical literature in this field, rainfall variability has failed to 
prove a significant contributor to conflict (Bernauer et al. 2010; Buhaug 2010). This is 
also true for the measures of hydro meteorological disasters (Theisen et al. 2010; 
Keavane and Grey 2008). Although climate change may pose a threat to human 
security, the findings here can not support the view that it may also represent a threat 
to security when defined in terms of violent conflict risk. The precipitation data that 
have been in focus here has also been used before, without any significant relationship 
between these variables and conflict being found. Neither Burke et al. (2009), or 
Buhaug (2010) found precipitation to be an important contributor to conflict in their 
respective studies. Choosing a slightly different approach here, and adding variables of 
hydro meteorological disasters, including interaction terms and using the data on a 
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smaller set of countries, clearly did not shake the ground on which their conclusions 
rest.  
The second possible explanation for the lack of robust findings in this thesis, however, 
has do to with the characteristics of the research design and of the data; more 
specifically what is known as measurement error. There are reasons to believe that the 
data applied in order to find answers to the general research question are not fully 
capable of doing so. One such reason is that the lack of robust results is not only true 
for the explanatory variables – but also for the control variables that are very much 
presumed to be significantly correlated with conflict. For instance, GDP did not give 
any statistically significant values, nor did it act consistently between the models. 
However to draw the conclusion that there is no connection between GDP and conflict 
would not only be opposed to logic reasoning, but also contrary to previous findings 
and the general established truth. Non – significant findings is not the same as negative 
findings – it simply means that the answers we are looking for have not been found. I 
will briefly consider three variants of such measurement errors that may have occurred 
in this thesis.   
First of all, it could be that the focus here has been on the “wrong” aggregation level. 
As recalled, the lack of available data properly matching my theoretical arguments led 
to certain modifications in the research design compared to the original wishes. In the 
literature in this field, certain findings do depend on the scale of measurement (Buhaug 
and Lujala 2005). Although there are solid theoretical reasons to focus on the country 
level, it remains possible that a lower level of aggregation in the statistical analyses 
would have changed the conclusions of this thesis.  Yet it is especially in regards to the 
temporal aspect of the precipitation measure, that the solution reached was not fully in 
accordance with my theoretical arguments. Although using a measure of precipitation 
as deviation from long-term trend was presumed a better solution than change from 
previous year alone, it is still not quite good enough - the argument that timing is an 
important element in determining the severity of the effects of rainfall variations was 
not fully captured by these indicators, as they are still measured on a yearly scale.  
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Would it have made any difference for my results had I used a different level of 
aggregation? This question remains hypothetical; yet some inferences can be drawn 
based on the findings of similar past studies, with both lower level of spatial and 
temporal aggregation.  The former approach is increasingly being tested by scholars, 
yet does not provide much consistency in terms of findings. On the sub national level, 
Levy et al. (2005) find some indications of rainfall below normal influencing larger 
civil wars, while Theisen et al. (2010) find no such link. The latter furthermore 
corresponds with findings of other studies focusing on the sub national level (Raleigh 
and Urdal 2007). In regards to a temporal disaggregation, there are to my knowledge 
few studies in this literature using such an approach. The findings of Meier et al. 
(2007), using monthly data to investigate climate and pastoral conflicts, had few 
significant and robust findings.  While the authors expect this to be a result of 
measurement error, it nevertheless leaves me with few empirical reasons to expect that 
such an approach would have changed my findings. Theoretically, however, the main 
reasoning behind the wish to use such an approach has not been challenged – annual 
measures, as used here, do not fully capture the intra annual variations that according 
to my arguments determine the relative damage of rainfall. Hence even though 
measures of hydro meteorological disasters partially made up for this, parts of the 
hypotheses still remains untested.  
Secondly, it could be that the lack of significant findings is a result of the number of 
observations being too small. This is also related to the aspects of the research design 
that regard data availability.  Although the main data has almost 900 observations, 
which I have argued should be enough to give significant findings, there are few 
observations with the value 1 on conflict onset; only 46 cases. For conflict intensity, 
the numbers are not much higher. Hence there may not be enough observations of 
conflict to give much information about what influences it. A first step to solve this 
would be to increase the number of observations. Yet, had there been a clear 
connection between the explanatory variables and the dependent variable as measured 
here, it would more than likely have given significant results in the analyses. This is 
backed by the fact that some variables in fact do stay significant and consistent 
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throughout the analysis. Furthermore, to explore the possibility that a higher number of 
positive observations could have changed the general pattern, a model was tested using 
conflict incidence as the dependent variable. Having over 200 observations of conflict, 
however, the explanatory variables still did not turn out neither significant nor 
consistent. Hence it remains highly uncertain that having more observations would 
have changed the outcome of the statistical analyses.  
The third variant of measurement error to be considered here has to do with data’s 
validity. It is possible that the data simply does not measure what I have expected it to 
measure. The overall low measures of variance informs that the main factors 
contributing to explain the variance in conflict as defined here, are not present in the 
models – despite the fact that both GDP and polity are very much assumed to be 
highly associated with conflict. This casts doubt over to what extent the indicators 
fully capture what they are meant to capture, hence their validity.  
All in all, then, the failure to find support for the hypotheses posed in this thesis might 
reflect the real world, but it could also be that certain aspects of the research design, 
especially due to limited data availability, has caused the lack of significant and 
consistent findings. The failure to find support for the three hypotheses does not, then, 
warrant the conclusion that the hypotheses – and the reasoning behind them – are 
proven wrong.  
Despite the fact that the main findings were too ambiguous and inconsistent to support 
the hypotheses, some trends in the results nevertheless prove interesting, especially in 
regards to the theoretical arguments that motivated the hypotheses. When studying 
conflict onset, one explanatory variable stayed positive, consistent and statistically 
significant throughout the analysis; precipitation deviation when lagged two years. 
While this pattern remains a bit difficult to explain substantially, especially due to the 
opposite effect being present when the variable is lagged one year, it is nevertheless 
possible when looking to the neo Malthusian perspective on resource scarcity. It is 
possible to imagine that the time it takes for rainfall variability to reach violent conflict 
- through the destruction of cropland, failed crops affecting livelihood, food 
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availability and perhaps the general economy, and the various social grievances that 
follows this – is approximately two years. This seems especially feasible when 
keeping in mind that agriculture represents 20 to 30 % of the GDP, makes up 55% of 
the value of exports and employs about 60 to 90 % of the total work force in Sub 
Saharan Africa (Brown and Crawford 2009: 10), and that this agriculture is 
furthermore highly rain – dependent.  
Another trend in the findings that is consistent with my arguments is that there are 
some noticeable differences between Sub Saharan Africa as a whole and East Africa 
when it comes to the effects of the explanatory variables. The reasoning behind having 
explored the two separately, is that East Africa follows a different precipitation pattern 
than the rest of the continent, with more rain being a likely outcome of climate change 
(Schreck and Semazzi 2004).  In the analyses of  East Africa, flood turned out 
significant in about half of the tested models for conflict onset, with consistent, 
positive values throughout all these tests. This effect was not present when analysing 
Sub Saharan Africa as a whole. The fact that East Africa, having more rain than the 
rest of the continent, shows different results could indicate that there are in fact some 
correlations between excessive rainfall and conflict, that have not been properly 
captured in this analysis. If this is true, then it is likely that there is some sort of 
threshold effect defining the relationship between the two; hence that the relationship 
is not linear. While the finding is not robust enough to draw any inferences beyond 
this, it does nevertheless highlight one of my main arguments in this thesis; that the 
effects of more rain, with emphasis on amount and timing, too should be accounted for 
when studying the potential effects precipitation has on violent conflict.  
The gap between theoretical reasoning and empirical evidence remains, however, this 
is not to say that the theoretical arguments can be denied. Despite of the lack of 
support for the hypotheses in this thesis, then, the findings might nevertheless indicate 
that the arguments presented here regarding the climate change - conflict nexus should 
be further explored. 
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8 Appendix 
8.1 Descriptive statistics and correlations 
Descriptive statistics for the dependent variables 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
            
conflict_onset 889 .0517435 .2216335 0 1 
            
conflict_intensity 881 .2474461 .6252788 0 2 
 
Correlation matrix conflict onset, original variables                          
  Onset Dev. Dev.1 Dev.2 Flood Drought GDP Ethnic pol lpop 
Onset  1                   
Deviation 0.021 1          
Deviation1 0.011 0.325 1         
Deviation2 0.088 0.109 0.278 1        
Flood 0.033 0.189 0.030 0.010 1       
Drought -0.018 -0.022 0.094 0.101 0.038 1      
GDP -0.047 0.073 0.076 0.040 -0.075 0.050 1     
Ethnic 0.035 0.019 0.002 0.010 0.081 -0.025 -0.411 1    
PolitySQ -0.130 -0.015 0.006 -0.015 -0.143 0.0265 0.312 -0.248 1   
Lpop 0.014 0.013 0.033 0.079 0.296 0.0398 -0.307 0.327 -0.240 1 
 
Correlation matrix conflict onset, recoded variables                       
  Onset Dev Dev.1 Dev.2 Flood Droug. GDP Pol Ethn. lpop 
Onset 1                   
Deviation 0.009 1          
Deviation1 -0.042 0.318 1         
Deviation2 0.038 0.246 0.315 1        
Flood 0.033 -0.010 -0.038 -0.005 1       
Drought -0.018 0.096 -0.002 -0.016 0.038 1      
GDP -0.038 0.124 0.095 0.089 -0.077 0.046 1     
PolitySQ -0.116 0.039 0.030 0.049 -0.111 0.014 0.340 1    
Ethnic 0.028 -0.068 -0.049 -0.063 0.044 -0.036 -0.315 -0.185 1   
Lpop 0.014 -0.271 -0.261 -0.250 0.296 0.040 -0.323 -0.214 0.217 1 
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Correlation matrix conflict intensity, original variables 
  Intensity dev Dev1 Dev2 Flood Drought GDP Ethnic Polity Lpop 
Intensity 1           
Deviation -0,013 1          
Deviation1 0.000 0.326 1         
Deviation2 0.036 0.107 0.278 1        
Flood 0.016 0.191 0.032 0.008 1       
Drought 0.051 -0,022 0.095 0.100 0.030 1      
GDP -0,098 0.074 0.077 0.041 -0,08 0.052 1     
Ethnic 0.066 0.020 0.001 0.011 0.082 -0,024 -0,415 1    
PolitySQ -0,096 -0,018 0.007 -0,02 -0,15 0.022 0.317 -0,246 1   
Lpop 0.176 0.014 0.034 0.070 0.293 0.037 -0,308 0.329 -0,243 1 
 
 
 
Correlation matrix conflict intensity, recoded variables     
  Intens. Dev Dev1 Dev2 Flood Drought GDP Poli. Ethn. Lpop 
Intensity 1           
Deviation -0,013 1          
Deviation1 -0,032 0.320 1         
Deviation2 -0,010 0.245 0.317 1        
Flood 0.016 -0,012 -0,038 -0,001 1       
Drought 0.051 0.093 -0,002 -0,013 0.030 1      
GDP -0,105 0.127 0.098 0.092 -0,079 0.049 1     
PolitySQ -0,118 0.039 0.0257 0.052 -0,114 0.012 0.345 1    
Ethnic 0.0490 -0,067 -0,045 -0,065 0.049 -0,033 -0.321 -0,181 1   
Lpop 0.176 -0,275 -0,262 -0,249 0.293 0.037 -0.329 -0,214 0.219 1 
 
 
 
81 
 
8.2 Do file 
******************************************************************* 
************************GETTING STARTED************************* 
set mem 100m 
use "M:\Stata\Main.dta", clear 
 
rename conflict conflict_incidence 
rename onset2 conflict_onset 
 
tsset ccode year, yearly 
 
******************************************************************* 
***************PREPARING THE VARIABLES*********************** 
****generating new versions of the variables 
*making square polity, and making new polity 
gen pol_sq =  polity2^2 
gen polsq_new =  pol_sq 
recode  polsq_new (0/25 = 1) (26/50 = 2) (51/75 = 3) (76/100 = 4) 
 
*making new ethnic variable, 4 categories 
gen ethnic_new =  al_ethnic 
recode  ethnic_new(0/.25 = 1) (.2501/.4999 = 2 ) (.5/.7499 = 3) (.75/1 = 4) 
 
*making new gdp, 4 categories 
gen gdp_new =   l_gdp 
recode  gdp_new (5.1/6.2 = 1) (6.2005/7.3 = 2) (7.3001/8.4 = 3 ) (8.4001/9.7 = 4) 
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* making deviation with 4 categories12
gen PreDev_new =  cprec_dev 
 
recode  PreDev_new (-.15/.15 = 1) (-.399/-.1501 = 2) (.1501/.399 = 2) /// 
(-.749/-.4 = 3) (.4/.749 = 3) ( .75/3 = 4) 
 
*repeating for the lagged precipitation variables 
gen PreDev1_new =  cprec_dev1 
recode  PreDev1_new (-.15/.15 = 1) (-.399/-.1501 = 2) (.1501/.399 = 2) /// 
(-.749/-.4 = 3) (.4/.749 = 3) ( .75/3 = 4) 
 
gen PreDev2_new =  cprec_dev2 
recode  PreDev2_new (-.15/.15 = 1) (-.399/-.1501 = 2) (.1501/.399 = 2) /// 
(-.749/-.4 = 3) (.4/.749 = 3) ( .75/3 = 4) 
 
* making vulnerability index 
gen vuln_ind =  gdp_new +  polsq_new +  ethnic_new 
 
******************** Making interaction terms************************* 
****making interactions with original variables 
gen int_dev_pol =  cprec_dev* pol_sq 
gen int_dev_etn =  cprec_dev* al_ethnic 
gen int_dev_lgdp = cprec_dev* l_gdp 
 
***making interaction terms for recoded variables 
gen int_d_gdp = gdp_new*PreDev_new 
gen int_d_etn = ethnic_new*PreDev_new 
                                                 
12 The same operation has been done for precipitation change 
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gen int_d_pol  =  PreDev_new* polsq_new 
 
gen int_d1_gdp =  PreDev1_new* gdp_new 
gen int_d1_pol =  PreDev1_new*  polsq_new 
gen int_d1_etn =  PreDev1_new*  ethnic_new 
 
gen int_d2_etn =  PreDev2_new* ethnic_new 
gen int_d2_pol =  PreDev2_new*  polsq_new 
gen int_d2_gdp =  PreDev2_new* gdp_new 
 
*making inteaction with reversed gdp 
gen temp =  gdp_new 
label variable temp "reversed gdp new" 
recode temp (1=4) (2=3) (3=2) (4=1) 
gen int_tgdp_dev =  temp* PreDev_new 
label variable int_tgdp_dev "interaction dev new and reversed gdp new" 
 
*generating interactions vulnerability index and each of the new deviations 
gen int_ind =  vuln_ind* PreDev_new 
gen int_ind1 =  vuln_ind* PreDev1_new 
gen int_ind2 =  vuln_ind* PreDev2_new 
 
* making the intensity variable 
gen intensity = . 
recode intensity .=1 if conflict_onset == 1 &  war_prio_new ==0 
recode intensity .=2 if conflict_onset == 0 &  war_prio_new ==1 
recode intensity .=0 if conflict_onset == 0 &  war_prio_new ==0 
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**************************************************************** 
******************* CORRELATIONS ***************************** 
set mem 100m 
use "M:\Stata\Main.dta", clear 
 
*Variable Correlations for main models 
corr  conflict_onset cprec_dev cprec_dev1 cprec_dev2 flood drought l_gdp /// 
al_ethnic  pol_sq lpop 
corr  conflict_onset PreDev_new PreDev1_new PreDev2_new flood drought /// 
gdp_new polsq_new ethnic_new lpop 
 
corr  intensity cprec_dev cprec_dev1 cprec_dev2 flood drought l_gdp al_ethnic /// 
pol_sq lpop 
corr  intensity PreDev_new PreDev1_new PreDev2_new flood drought  gdp_new /// 
polsq_new ethnic_new lpop 
 
*Variable correlation for main models, East Africa 
drop if ccode<=499 
drop if ccode==571 
drop if ccode==570 
drop if ccode==580 
drop if ccode==541 
drop if ccode==565 
drop if ccode==560 
drop if ccode==551 
drop if ccode==552 
drop if ccode==572 
drop if ccode==540 
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drop if ccode==553 
 
corr  conflict_onset cprec_dev cprec_dev1 cprec_dev2 flood drought l_gdp /// 
al_ethnic pol_sq lpop 
corr  conflict_onset PreDev_new PreDev1_new PreDev2_new flood drought /// 
gdp_new polsq_new ethnic_new lpop 
 
corr  intensity cprec_dev cprec_dev1 cprec_dev2 flood drought l_gdp al_ethnic /// 
pol_sq lpop 
corr  intensity PreDev_new PreDev1_new PreDev2_new flood drought gdp_new /// 
polsq_new ethnic_new lpop 
 
*Model correlations 13
logistic conflict_onset  cprec_dev cprec_dev1 cprec_dev2 drought flood  al_ethnic /// 
l_gdp pol_sq lpop  
 
vce 
 
logistic conflict_onset PreDev_new PreDev1_new PreDev2_new flood drought /// 
gdp_new  polsq_new ethnic_new lpop 
vce 
 
ologit intensity cprec_dev cprec_dev1 cprec_dev2 flood drought l_gdp al_ethnic /// 
pol_sq lpop 
vce 
 
ologit intensity PreDev_new PreDev1_new PreDev2_new flood drought gdp_new /// 
polsq_new ethnic_new lpop 
vce 
 
 
                                                 
13 Main models demonstrated only 
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****************************************************************** 
*******************REGRESSION MODELS************************** 
*******The tables demonstrated in the thesis***** 
***Logistic regression for conflict onset14
set mem 100m 
 
use "M:\Stata\Main.dta", clear 
 
*Tables 1 and 2 
logistic conflict_onset   cprec_ch cprec_ch1 cprec_ch2 flood drought  l_gdp /// 
 al_ethnic pol_sq lpop 
outreg2 using table1, 2aster nolabel word bdec (3) alpha (0.05, 0.1) replace 
 
logistic conflict_onset    cprec_dev cprec_dev1 cprec_dev2 flood drought  l_gdp /// 
al_ethnic pol_sq lpop 
outreg2 using table1, 2aster nolabel word bdec (3) alpha (0.05, 0.1) append 
 
logistic conflict_onset  cprec_dev1 cprec_dev2 flood drought  l_gdp al_ethnic  /// 
pol_sq int_dev_lgdp lpop 
outreg2 using table1, 2aster nolabel word bdec (3) alpha (0.05, 0.1) append 
 
logistic conflict_onset PreDev1_new PreDev2_new flood drought gdp_new /// 
ethnic_new polsq_new int_d_gdp lpop 
outreg2 using table1, 2aster nolabel word bdec (3) alpha (0.05, 0.1) append 
 
logistic conflict_onset  PreDev_new PreDev1_new PreDev2_new flood drought /// 
gdp_new  ethnic_new polsq_new  lpop 
outreg2 using table1, 2aster nolabel word bdec (3) alpha (0.05, 0.1) append 
                                                 
14 The command “logistic” was used to get the coefficients as odds ratios, however in the 
outreg tables they are demonstrated as log odds 
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* East Africa (Table 2 has the same operations as table 1) 
drop if ccode<=499 
drop if ccode==571 
drop if ccode==570 
drop if ccode==580 
drop if ccode==541 
drop if ccode==565 
drop if ccode==560 
drop if ccode==551 
drop if ccode==552 
drop if ccode==572 
drop if ccode==540 
drop if ccode==553 
 
*** Ordered logistic regressions for conflict intensity 
set mem 100m 
use "M:\Stata\Main.dta", clear 
 
*Tables 3 and 415
ologit  intensity  cprec_ch cprec_ch1 cprec_ch2 flood drought  l_gdp al_ethnic /// 
pol_sq lpop 
 
outreg2 using table3, 2aster nolabel word bdec (3) alpha (0.05, 0.1) replace 
 
ologit  intensity  cprec_dev cprec_dev1 cprec_dev2 flood drought  l_gdp al_ethnic /// 
pol_sq lpop 
outreg2 using table3, 2aster nolabel word bdec (3) alpha (0.05, 0.1) append 
                                                 
15 The same operations, but for the East African countries as shown under table 2.   
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ologit  intensity  cprec_dev1 cprec_dev2 flood drought  l_gdp al_ethnic pol_sq  /// 
int_dev_lgdp lpop 
outreg2 using table3, 2aster nolabel word bdec (3) alpha (0.05, 0.1) append 
 
ologit intensity  PreDev1_new PreDev2_new flood drought gdp_new ethnic_new  /// 
polsq_new int_d_gdp lpop 
outreg2 using table3, 2aster nolabel word bdec (3) alpha (0.05, 0.1) append 
 
ologit intensity  PreDev_new PreDev1_new PreDev2_new flood drought gdp_new /// 
ethnic_new polsq_new  lpop 
outreg2 using table3, 2aster nolabel word bdec (3) alpha (0.05, 0.1) append 
 
************Some of the models not included in the tables16
set mem 100m 
 ************* 
use "M:\Stata\Main.dta", clear 
tsset ccode year, yearly 
 
logistic  conflict_onset PreDev1_new  PreDev2_new flood drought l_gdp pol_sq /// 
al_ethnic lpop if  PreDev_new == 1 
 
logistic  conflict_onset PreDev1_new  PreDev2_new flood drought l_gdp pol_sq /// 
al_ethnic lpop if  PreDev_new == 2 
 
logistic conflict_onset  cprec_dev1 cprec_dev2 flood drought  al_ethnic l_gdp /// 
pol_sq lpop if cprec_dev<=0 
 
logistic conflict_onset  cprec_dev1 cprec_dev2 flood drought  al_ethnic l_gdp /// 
pol_sq lpop if cprec_dev>=0 
                                                 
16 The same operation was executed on both East Africa and for the intensity variable using 
the ”ologit” command rather than “logistic” 
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logistic conflict_onset  cprec_dev cprec_dev1 cprec_dev2 flood L.drought l_gdp /// 
al_ethnic pol_sq lpop 
 
logistic conflict_onset  cprec_dev cprec_dev1 cprec_dev2 flood L2.drought l_gdp /// 
al_ethnic pol_sq lpop 
  
logistic conflict_onset  cprec_dev cprec_dev1 cprec_dev2 L.flood drought l_gdp /// 
al_ethnic pol_sq lpop 
 
logistic conflict_onset  cprec_dev cprec_dev1 cprec_dev2 L.flood L.drought l_gdp /// 
al_ethnic pol_sq lpop 
 
logistic  conflict_incidence  cprec_dev cprec_dev1 cprec_dev2 flood drought l_gdp/// 
al_ethnic pol_sq lpop 
  
* Making Sub Saharan Africa excluded East Africa 
drop if ccode==516 
drop if ccode==522 
drop if ccode==530 
drop if ccode==501 
drop if ccode==517 
drop if ccode==520 
drop if ccode==625 
drop if ccode==500 
drop if ccode==510 
 
 
 
 
